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This thesis investigates the computational and modeling issues involved with 
developing solutions for distributed service scheduling problems. Compared with 
traditional manufacturing scheduling, service scheduling poses additional challenges due 
to the significant customer involvement in service processes. The first challenge is that the 
service scheduling environment is a distributed environment in which scheduling-related 
information is scattered among individual identities, such as service providers and 
customers. The second challenge is that the service scheduling environment is a dynamic 
environment. Uncertainty in customer demand, customer cancellations and no-shows make 
the scheduling of services a complex dynamic process. Service scheduling has to be robust 
and prepared to accommodate any contingencies caused by customer involvement in 
service production. The third challenge concerns customers’ private information. To 
compute optimal schedules, ideally, the scheduler should know the complete customer 
availability and preference information within the scheduling horizon. However, customers 
may act strategically to protect their private information. Therefore, service scheduling 
systems should be designed so that they are able to elicit enough of a customer’s private 
information that will make it possible to compute high quality schedules. The fourth 
challenge is that in a service scheduling environment, the objectives are complicated and 
they may even be in opposition. The distributed service scheduling environment enables 
each agent to have their own scheduling objectives. The objectives of these agents can vary 
from one to another. In addition to multiple objectives, since agents are self-interested, they 
are likely to behave strategically to achieve their own objectives without considering the 
global objectives of the system. Existing approaches usually deal with only a part of the 
challenges in a specific service domain. There is a need for general problem formulations 
and solutions that address service scheduling challenges in a comprehensive framework.  
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In this thesis, I propose an integrated service scheduling framework for the general 
service scheduling problem. The proposed framework uses iterative auction as the base 
mechanism to tackle service scheduling challenges in distributed and dynamic 
environments. It accommodates customer’s private information by providing appropriate 
incentives to customers and it has the potential to accommodate dynamic events. This 
framework integrates customers’ preferences with the allocation of a provider’s capacity 
through multilateral negotiation between the provider and its customers. The framework 
can accommodate both price-based commercial settings and non-commercial service 
settings. Theoretical and experimental results are developed to verify the effectiveness of 
the proposed framework. The application of the framework to the mass customization of 
services and to appointment scheduling are developed to demonstrate the applicability of 
the general framework to specific service domains. A web-based prototype is designed and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Motivation 
Service scheduling is a decision-making process which allocates limited service 
resources to service activities over time while satisfying certain constraints and optimizing 
one or more objectives. Service scheduling problems are common to many domains such 
as healthcare, transportation and computing. Compared to scheduling problems in 
manufacturing, service scheduling problems have unique characteristics. In manufacturing 
an activity usually transforms a physical component and adds value to it; resources are 
typically referred to as machines and the configuration of machines; objectives are 
typically a function of the completion times, due dates, and the deadlines of jobs (Pinedo, 
2009). In service settings, an activity usually involves people. Examples include a meeting 
that has to be attended by certain individuals, a flight that transports passengers, an 
operation that has to be done by a surgeon on a given day. Services usually require both 
physical and human resources.  In contrast to most manufacturing scheduling models, in 
service settings, additional factors such as personnel costs, customer waiting costs and 
customer preferences are often considered in the objective function.  
The differences between manufacturing and service scheduling are mainly derived 
from the fundamental characteristic that defines service processes. A service significantly 
involves customer inputs (Sampson & Froehle, 2006). In other words, in order for a service 
to be produced, a customer has to personally be present, or he/she has to present his/her 
belongings or information. Compared to classical manufacturing scheduling models, this 
significant involvement of customer inputs presents additional challenges, including 
distributed and dynamic scheduling environments, the presence of customers’ private 
information (e.g. the value they place on various scheduling alternatives and their 
availability), and often considerably more complicated scheduling objectives.  
1.1 Example application domains 
To motivate this research from a practical perspective, here are some examples of 
service scheduling:  
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1.1.1 Transportation service scheduling 
The transportation industry comprises a variety of service scheduling problems, such 
as the routing and scheduling of airplanes, timetabling of trains and carrier scheduling. The 
carrier scheduling problem, which determines what shipping orders should be assigned to 
which carriers in a transportation network, is addressed in this work. Each order that has to 
be transported is characterized by its weight, load port, delivery port, and the time 
constraints on the loading and delivery times. The carriers and the orders usually belong to 
different organizations and economic entities, and the customers most likely do not want 
to reveal information about the highest shipping prices they are willing to pay. Therefore, 
carriers’ schedules should be generated in a distributed environment where the information 
about carriers and the order information is scattered among multiple independent 
organizations. For a carrier, a schedule defines the sequence of ports that should be visited 
within the scheduling window, the time of entry at each port and the orders loaded or 
delivered at each port. The uncertainty of travel time affects the pickup/delivery times for 
carriers on congested urban roads, and so the generated schedule should be robust in 
dynamic environments.  
The objective of carrier scheduling typically is to minimize the total cost of transporting 
all orders. This total cost consists of a number of elements, namely the carrier’s operating 
costs, the fuel costs, and the port charges. 
1.1.2 Appointment scheduling in healthcare 
There are a variety of problems involved with healthcare systems’ scheduling, such as 
patient scheduling, laboratory and bed allocation scheduling, ambulances and emergency 
room scheduling and hospital personnel (doctors, nurses, technicians) scheduling. Here the 
appointment scheduling of high-volume specialized diagnostic services, such as magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) scanning and computed tomography (CT) scanning is used as an 
example, as it interacts with the services’ customers, deals directly with demand 
uncertainty and has a large influence on many other departments. In such an environment, 
the capacity of diagnostic resources is limited, is expensive to expand, the demand is highly 
unpredictable and the waiting lists are already substantial. Healthcare managers and 
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policymakers are therefore under considerable political and community pressure to better 
manage healthcare resources in order to provide patients with high quality care. To this 
end, appointment scheduling plays a key role.  
Typically there are three objectives in the appointment scheduling problems. The first 
is to maximize the utilization of the service resource given the patients’ availabilities. The 
second one is to maximize the sum of the of the scheduled patients’ priority levels. The 
third objective is to accommodate patients’ preferences. Accommodating patients’ 
preferences in appointment scheduling is important because matching patients with their 
preferred service provider and offering them a convenient appointment time can decrease 
the number of no-shows and thereby increase operational efficiency (Barron 1980). 
However, accommodating scheduling preferences across a large number of patients is 
particularly challenging due to three areas of complexities: collection complexity, 
allocation complexity and elicitation complexity. Collection complexity refers to the 
efforts needed to collect preferences information from patients, which is not an easy task. 
The vast majority of appointment-booking systems are not automated. They have to rely 
on human schedulers to collect preferences information, which incurs high administrative 
costs to the healthcare system. Allocation complexity refers to the computation needed to 
compute high-quality service time allocations. Accommodating preferences can easily 
make mathematical models of the appointment booking process intractable, which is 
perhaps one reason why the majority of mathematical models do not include preferences 
(Gupta and Denton 2008). These issues are further complicated by the fact that patients are 
reluctant to reveal their availability. They are actually motivated to protect their private 
information because revealing too much availability increases the patient’s possibility of 
being assigned an undesirable time slot. 
1.1.3 Scientific facility scheduling 
The facilities at national science research laboratories are accessible to scientists and 
researchers so that they can perform their experiments. Researchers’ proposals for using 
these facilities are evaluated each year. The research laboratories normally start by 
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scheduling those experiments with higher priority, and try to schedule as many experiments 
as possible.  
Canadian Light Sources (CLS: http://www.lightsource.ca/), is a national science 
research laboratory for the production of high-intensity synchrotron light from the infrared, 
visible, and ultraviolet to X-ray region of the electromagnetic spectrum, and is accessible 
to scientists and researchers from the academic, government and private sectors. Currently, 
CLS has about 3000 researchers in Canada and other parts of the world as its user 
community. CLS send out two calls for proposals each year, resulting in a six-month 
scheduling cycle. Proposals are evaluated by a scientific committee composed of 
researchers from universities and industries across the country. Each application is 
assigned a weight based on its potential contribution to the advancement of knowledge and 
impact on the scientific community. Approved proposals by the peer review procedure 
need to be scheduled in the next scheduling cycle. CLS needs to improve the utilization of 
its valuable synchrotron resources and, at the same time, maximize the overall scientific 
contributions of the experiments. CLS knows the weight (scientific contribution value) of 
each application. However, they do not have direct access to researchers’/customers’ 
availability information, and customers are actually motivated not to reveal their 
availability because revealing too much availability increases the possibility of being 
assigned an undesirable time slot. The lack of complete availability information can be a 
major constraint that limits the quality of the schedules. High-quality schedules may be 
determined to be impossible, given the partial availability of customer information. The 
service providers are faced with a decentralized scheduling problem, in the sense that the 
true availability of the customers is their own private information and may not be known 
to the service provider. 
1.1.4 Cloud computing services 
“Cloud computing refers to both the applications delivered as services over the Internet 
and the hardware and systems software in the data centers that provide those services” 
(Armbrust et al. 2009). With the growth of the cloud computing market, more and more 
companies start to provide their software and hardware products as services to their 
 5 
 
customers. Service resource management systems need to provide mechanisms and tools 
that allow resource consumers (end users) to express their requirements and their time 
constraints. For any request, a customer has preferences over its completion time and is 
willing to pay a premium to have it completed during the preferred time windows. Given 
time constraints of service requests, to maximize profits, the provider has to prioritize 
service requests based on their profitability and, at the same time, schedule as many 
profitable requests as possible. The customer’s value of a schedule (i.e. the price that she 
is willing to pay for the request to be completed at a specific time) is her private 
information. Each customer is motivated to maximize her own payoff, not the system wide 
optimality. In this context, the scheduling problem is a distributed optimization problem in 
a strategic setting, which calls for game theoretic solutions. 
In the next section, I first describe the Unified Services Theory (Sampson, 2001), which 
categorically defines services, and then analyze the challenges in service scheduling in 
light of that theory. 
1.2 Unified Services Theory  
Services have been commonly defined as intangible products (Pearce, 1981, p. 390; 
Bannock et al., 1982, p. 372; Harvey, 1998, p. 596). In other words, a service typically 
does not result in the ownership of anything (Kotler, 2006, p. 402). Intangibility is an 
important characteristic of services. However, as stated in Sampson and Froehle (2006), it 
does not serve as a sufficient condition which defines a production process as a service. 
For example, software development results in a product that is intangible (computer code), 
but the output can indeed be inventoried and used or sold later. Unified Services Theory, 
on the other hand, identifies a single commonality that comprises all services. It defines 
what services are and what they are not. To facilitate the analysis of service implications 
to scheduling, it is useful to first introduce the Unified Service Theory. 
The Unified Services Theory (UST) is formally stated as follows (Sampson, 2001, p. 
16):  
“With service processes, the customer provides significant inputs into the production process. With 
manufacturing processes, groups of customers may contribute ideas to the design of the product, 
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but individual customers’ only participation is to select and consume the output. All managerial 
themes unique to services are founded in this distinction.” 
The most important component in UST is customer inputs, which distinguish services 
from manufacturing processes and are the root cause of the unique issues and challenges 
of services management. The literature has typically identified three general types of 
customer inputs (Wemmerlov, 1990): the customer’s self, his belongings or other tangible 
objects, and information. Customer-self inputs are common in services involving co-
production (i.e., the employment of customer labor in the process) and in services involving 
the physical presence of the customer. Typical examples are health care clinics, buffet 
restaurants and taxi services. These service providers can prepare for production, but they 
cannot execute the actual service process until necessary customer-self inputs are present. 
Tangible belongings (or property) and physical objects make up another type of input a 
customer can provide to the service process. One’s car is an essential input into the 
automobile repair service process and one’s clothing is a necessary input to the dry cleaning 
service process. Providing tangible inputs often allows the service process to proceed even 
without the customer being physically present. Customer-provided information is a third 
type of input to the service process. For example, the tax return preparation process requires 
that customers provide financial information as the process inputs. The service production 
process cannot begin without the input of that information. 
The UST reveals principles that are common to the wide range of services and provides 
a unifying foundation for various theories and models of service operations. As 
demonstrated in Sampson and Froehle (2006), the UST has significant operational 
corollaries pertaining to the services management process. Among them, capacity 
management and demand management significantly rely on the scheduling of service 
resources. The challenges in designing service scheduling systems are presented in the rest 
of this section. 
1.3 Challenges of Service Scheduling 
Scheduling plays an important role in service management due to the perishable nature 
of service provider’s capacity. A service provider has to pay scheduled workers even 
though there are no customers currently needing services. In other words, the service 
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provider’s capacity to produce the service is time-sensitive and cannot be inventorized by 
producing to stock. This high “operating leverage” implies that many service operations 
will be much more cost-competitive if the service providers effectively manage variable 
demand (Hur et al., 2004; Jack & Powers, 2004), which gives them higher utilization levels 
(Sampson, 2001, p. 240) or, alternately, manage capacity, which increase their volumes.  
The management of demand and capacity involves the allocation of service orders and 
resources over time, which is essentially a scheduling activity. On the demand management 
side, reservation systems schedule customer inputs into the production process such that 
waiting times are minimized. On the capacity management side, service managers schedule 
full- and part-time personnel to meet the expected workload for a future day. When the day 
of service arrives, if a significant gap is present between the experienced workload so far 
and the scheduled staff capacity, service managers will attempt to make an immediate 
adjustment to the staff schedule by changing station assignment, shifting breaks, or calling 
in additional workers (Hur et al., 2004). Compared with classical manufacturing 
scheduling, service scheduling presents different challenges attributable to significant 
customer inputs in service production processes. Three important service scheduling 
challenges, namely distributed and dynamic environments, complicated objectives and 
customers’ private information are described below. 
Distributed and dynamic environment: The customer input requirement in services 
leads to a distributed and dynamic scheduling environment. First, the information needed 
for computing schedules, e.g. customers’ availability and preference information, is 
scattered among possibly a large number of customers. Collecting the information and 
keeping it up to date can be challenging tasks. For example, consider the appointment 
scheduling problem.  As mentioned before, considering patients’ preferences and their 
availability are both important because patients need to be present themselves as an input 
to the service process. However, information about patient’s preferences is distributed 
among patients themselves, and patient’s preferences may change over time because of 
changes in work schedule or marital status. Therefore, appointment scheduling problems 
should be generated in a distributed and dynamic environment.   
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Transportation scheduling is another example of a distributed environment in service 
scheduling. Transportation companies have to carry out transportation orders. These orders 
are customer inputs which are distributed geographically. Each order should be picked up 
from a location and delivered to a destination. Transportation companies are 
geographically distributed and have a set of trucks at their local disposal. Each company 
makes decisions about its local scheduling according to the local trucks and the actual 
solution to the global order scheduling emerges from the local decision-making of these 
companies. Modeling the companies as independent and autonomous units seems the only 
acceptable way to proceed, because the task of centrally maintaining knowledge about all 
of the shipping companies, their vehicles and their policies is very complex. Moreover, this 
information is often not even centrally available (real-life companies are not willing to 
share all their local information with other companies) (Fischer et al. 1995). 
In addition to the complexity arising from the distributed environment, service 
scheduling has to be robust in accommodating the contingencies caused by customer 
involvement in service production. Uncertainties regarding   customer demand, resource 
availability, service times, customer cancellations and no-shows make the scheduling of 
services a complex dynamic process. For example, in the appointment scheduling problem, 
patients who make an appointment and fail to keep it can lead to poor resource utilization 
and longer patient waiting times. Service durations are also subject to change in 
appointment scheduling. Patient attributes such as age, degree of disease progression, 
cultural background and language fluency (need for an interpreter) can affect service 
durations (Gupta & Denton 2008). Longer than expected service duration results in late 
starts for the rest of the services that day. Late starts leads to costs associated with overtime 
staffing. 
Service organizations also face uncertainty in the numbers of consumers and their 
resource demand. Examples include mail processing facilities, airline reservation desks, 
hospitals, telephone operators, and so on. In each of these dynamic environments, 
personnel scheduling is a challenging problem, and the goal is to assign personnel with 
different skills to each shift in order to cover the predicted demand.  
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In a service setting, customers may be requested to include additional, unanticipated 
tasks, or to adapt to changes to several tasks, or to neglect certain tasks. For example, 
consider the appointment scheduling problem. Medical treatments in a primary care clinic 
are often not completely pre-determined before an examination. The examination results 
may invoke additional activities and/or make other medical actions unnecessary (Paulussen 
et al. 2003).  The beginning time and the processing time of a task are also subject to 
variations. A task can take more or less time than anticipated, and the customer inputs can 
arrive early or late. An optimal schedule, generated after considerable effort, may rapidly 
become unacceptable because of unforeseen dynamic situations. Since service capacity 
cannot be inventoried by producing goods, customers that fail to present their inputs 
according to the schedule can contribute to poor resource utilization, lower revenues and 
longer waiting times. The time-sensitive nature of service capacities signifies the need for 
more robust dynamic scheduling approaches. In addition, unlike manufacturing 
environments where the amount of resources (which are typically machines) is usually 
fixed (at least for the short term), in services, the number of resources (e.g. people, rooms, 
and trucks) may vary over time. Certain resources may become unavailable, and additional 
resources may need to be introduced. This variable can even be a part of the objective 
function (Pinedo, 2009).  
As an example of a dynamic service scheduling environment consider a transportation 
scheduling problem in which orders have to be picked up and delivered at specific customer 
locations by a limited number of trucks. The main challenge is that the orders are not all 
known in advance. New orders can be received and then must be incorporated into the 
scheduling process. Truck availability adds further dynamicity. Trucks may be delayed or 
temporarily unavailable due to traffic or other unforeseen problems. In addition, the actual 
sizes of orders are subject to change (Davidsson et al, 2005). 
In another dynamic service scheduling example, consider service computing where the 
amount of resources varies over time. In this environment, resources need to  be  
dynamically  (re-)configured  and  bundled  via  virtualization  to  provide  different  service  
profiles  for  dynamic demands (Sim, 2012). 
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The service scheduling process is further complicated by the fact that customers’ needs 
for services have varying degrees of urgency, and some decisions about non-urgent 
requests must be made before the complete information about urgent and emergency 
demands is known. Take the example of appointment scheduling in diagnostic services; 
the low-priority demand (outpatients) must be booked (often several weeks in advance) 
before knowing the highly unpredictable high-priority demand (inpatients). To 
accommodate the demand imposed by the highly dynamic high-priority inpatients, the 
hospital is forced to reserve a significant portion of the total capacity for this unknown 
high-priority demand, leaving little room for outpatients. This results in unused capacity 
on days when inpatient demand is lower than expected and thus longer waiting times for 
outpatients than there would if this unused capacity could be utilized. Moreover, a patient’s 
priority may change along the treatment process.    
Complicated objectives: Planning and scheduling objectives in service industries are 
often considerably more complicated than those in manufacturing. Scheduling objectives 
in manufacturing are typically a function of the completion times, the due dates, and the 
deadlines of the jobs. Objectives in services often have additional dimensions. In contrast 
to manufacturing, the number of resources in a service environment may be variable (e.g. 
the number of full-time and part-time people employed). Given this situation, there may 
very well be a different type of objective – one that minimizes the number of resources 
used and/or minimizes the cost associated with the use of these resources (Pinedo, 2009). 
This minimization is a typical objective of capacity management.  
Customer preferences regarding the timing of delivering their inputs should also be 
considered in service scheduling, as they represent the value that customers attribute to a 
schedule.  For example, in healthcare services, patients want more personalized care, which 
includes their involvement in selecting appointment times. Some patients prefer an 
appointment on same day they call, or soon thereafter, and the day of the week or the time 
of the appointment is not particularly important to them. Others prefer a particular day of 
the week and a convenient time. These patients do not mind waiting for convenience. In 
both private and public healthcare systems, healthcare managers are motivated to achieve 
high scores on patient satisfaction surveys. In addition, offering patients a convenient 
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appointment time can decrease the number of no-shows and thereby increase operational 
efficiency (Wang and Gupta, 2011).  
Transportation service scheduling is another example of complicated objectives in 
service scheduling. The objective typically is to minimize the total cost of transporting all 
orders. This total cost consists of a number of elements, namely the ships’ operating cost, 
fuel costs and the port charges. There are two kinds of ships operating in this realm. One 
type is company-owned and the other type is chartered. The operating costs of a company-
owned ship are different from those of a charter. Companies make decisions about using 
their own resources or using chartered ships in a way that minimize their total cost (Pinedo, 
2009). 
Customers’ private information: Service processes involve significant customer 
inputs, which, in many cases, require that services are produced and consumed 
simultaneously. Scheduling systems are used to synchronize the timing of the use of the 
different types of resources and the presence of customer inputs. To compute optimal 
schedules, ideally the scheduler should know the complete customer availability 
information within the scheduling horizon. However, collecting availability information 
across a large number of customers requires a significant amount of communication 
between the scheduler and the customers. This amount of communication can incur high 
administrative costs if the collecting procedure is not automated, which is the case of most 
existing service scheduling systems. The issue is further complicated by the fact that 
customers are reluctant to reveal their complete availability because their personal schedule 
is their private information and revealing too much availability increases the possibility 
that a customer will be assigned an undesirable time slot. 
 Consider the scientific facility scheduling environment. The CLS has two calls for 
proposals each year resulting in a scheduling cycle of 6 months. Bob needs to conduct his 
experiment in the facility. He can be available anytime from January to August. However, 
he prefers the experiment to be scheduled as early as possible because there is a possibility 
that he may go on vacation sometime during the summer. Based on his previous experience 
and his knowledge of the profile of the current year’s applications, he believes that 
experiments with similar weights to his are likely to be offered a service time slot two 
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months after the originally requested dates. Therefore, statistically, if he reports January to 
April as his available time window, he will have a much higher chance of being assigned 
time June or even sometime earlier. Therefore, based on his calculation and his knowledge 
base, Bob may indicate only January to April, which is not his complete availability. 
For another example, consider meeting scheduling in which participants’ calendars are 
usually considered private objects and so their information as confidential. There are 
situations when participants do not want to make their available time public. For example, 
people usually will not hire a consultant or schedule an appointment with a dentist who 
indicates that he/she has plenty of free time. Because  of  the  social attribution  of “ 
importance ” to  people  with  little  free time, many people may not be willing to publish 
their actual  availability (Wainer et al. 2007).   
Cloud computing systems that allow users to acquire computing resources and pay for 
it on a short-term basis are another example of service scheduling where customers have 
private information. From the economics literature (Zaman and Grosu 2011), it is evident 
that a fixed-price mechanism cannot support efficient resource allocation and cannot 
guarantee that the user who values an item the most will get it. Achieving economic 
efficiency in resource allocation should thus be based on the perceived values of the users. 
User value is the user’s private value; it is the highest price they are willing to pay for a 
given service. In many cases, users are reluctant to reveal their values and may fear that 
the provider will take advantage of their information and use it to charge higher prices for 
their required services. 
For multiple reasons, customers are motivated to protect their private information. 
Therefore, service scheduling systems should be designed so that they are able to elicit the 
necessary customer’s private information required to compute high-quality schedules. The 
computation spent on eliciting customers’ availability information is referred to as a 
system’s elicitation complexity.  
1.4 Scope and Approach 
  The objective of this research is to develop theories and approaches to service 
scheduling problems. Economic-based models (auction-based in particular) are used as the 
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anchor from which to tackle the challenges in commercial service scheduling and non-
commercial service scheduling problems. The contributions can be summarized as follows: 
(1) presenting an integrated framework that addresses the scheduling challenges in general 
service scheduling problems, (2) developing economic-based approaches for both 
commercial and non-commercial service environments, (3) showing the effectiveness of 
the framework through its application to various application domains, and (4) designing 
and implementing a prototype to validate the computational properties of the proposed 
framework. 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of 
traditional scheduling approaches to service scheduling and reviews the literature on agent-
based service scheduling. Chapter 3 describes the general service scheduling problem 
studied in this thesis. An iterative bidding framework for services scheduling is presented 
in chapter 4, followed by that same framework adapted for scheduling non-commercial 
services in chapter 5. In chapter 6 I demonstrate the applicability of the proposed 
framework in two different application domains. The design and implementation of a 
prototype of the proposed approach and the simulation results are presented in Chapter 7 




Chapter 2 Literature Review 
This chapter presents a review of service scheduling models. General scheduling 
problem definitions are introduced first, followed by an overview of traditional centralized 
service scheduling approaches. The focus is then narrowed to the literature on agent-based 
service scheduling. Finally, the related literature is summarized, with an emphasis on how 
each work addresses the challenges in service scheduling and identifying the presented 
research position in relation to the big picture of existing approaches.  
2.1 Definitions of the scheduling problem 
Scheduling is a decision-making process which deals with the allocation of resources 
to tasks over given time periods under imposed constraints; its goal is to optimize one or 
more objectives. Bowman (Bowman, 1959) presented a simple definition from operations 
research field perspective: The scheduling problem in its most simple form consists of a 
number of jobs to be done on a number of machines, each job having a number of 
operations to be performed by the various machines in a specified sequence; what feasible 
schedule covers the least total time? 
Pinedo (2008) and Brucker (2004) provide more complete description of various 
scheduling problem models. Although there are a variety of definitions, most of the 
scheduling problems can fit into a four element: resources, jobs, constraints, and 
objectives. Figure 2-1 presents the relationships of these elements: resources are assigned 
to jobs over time, this assignment process is restricted by the constraints and guided by the 
objectives. Note that, in the context of scheduling, indicating that a resource is assigned to 
a job does not mean that that resource is dedicated to that job. A more accurate 
interpretation would refer to a period of processing time from a resource is assigned to a 
job.  In Figure 2-1, the dotted arrow pointing from the Processing Times to the “Assigned” 




Figure 2-1 Four-element structure of scheduling problems (Wang, 2007) 
In general, resources and jobs can take many forms. The resources may be a machine, 
operating room, airport gate, processing units in a computing environment, and so on. The 
jobs may be transporting a cargo, take-offs and landings at an airport, surgery, executions 
of computer programs, etc. Constraints are a set of conditions that must be satisfied, e.g. 
precedence constraints, time window constraints on release time, deadlines, or resource 
capacity constraints. Objectives may be the minimization of makespan, or of total cost, 
maximization of the resource utilization, or of the throughput. A solution to a scheduling 
problem is called feasible schedule if it satisfies all constraints of the problem. Otherwise, 
it is called an infeasible schedule. 
2.2 Centralized Service Scheduling Approaches 
Traditional service scheduling approaches usually assume a centralized environment in 
which a scheduler has all the information needed to compute the schedule. Various service 
scheduling models have been proposed, implemented, and evaluated, some for several 
decades. Generally speaking, the solution methods form two distinct classes: exact methods 
and heuristic methods. Exact methods are guaranteed to find a solution if it exists, and 
typically provide some indication if no solution can be found. However, given the NP-hard 
nature of service scheduling models, exact methods are not practical for non-trivial 
problem instances. Heuristic methods do not guarantee optimization, but typically assure, 
experimentally or analytically, some degree of optimality in their solutions. They are 
usually rapid and practical ways of solving larger-sized scheduling problems. In this 
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section, we briefly review some general heuristic methods and their application to service 
scheduling problem. 
2.2.1  Genetic algorithms 
Genetic Algorithms (GAs) are a set of global search and optimization methods for 
solving complex optimization problems with a large search space. With the objective of 
reaching the “best” solution, GAs systematically evolve a population of candidate solutions 
by using evolutionary computational processes inspired by genetic variation and natural 
selection. One of the earliest GAs for scheduling was proposed by Davis (1985). Davis 
suggested an indirect representation which can be decoded to form the actual schedule of 
the scheduling problem. GAs have been applied to many service scheduling problems. For 
example, Ghaemi et al. (2007) proposed a co-evaluation algorithm for university 
timetabling problems. Paechter et al. (1995, 1996) apply a memetic algorithm for course 
timetabling. The memetic algorithm explores the neighbourhood of the solution obtained 
by GA and navigates the search towards the local optima. Graph colouring heuristics were 
used by Burke et al. (1995, 1996, & 1998) to improve and accelerate the search process in 
timetabling. Burke et al. (1995) also developed a hybrid GA to ensure that the most 
fundamental constraints are never violated in timetabling problem. They showed that the 
algorithm is guaranteed to produce a feasible solution by hard coding the constraints and 
using a hybrid crossover operator. In addition to timetabling, GAs have also been used to 
solve scheduling problems in healthcare, such as patient scheduling and nurse scheduling 
(Petrovic & Morshed, 2011; Aickelin & Dowsland, 2001). 
2.2.2 Simulated annealing 
Simulated Annealing (SA), is a neighbourhood search method. Rather than always 
choosing the direction of the best improvement, which gives the steepest-ascent, SA 
initially chooses random or semi-random directions, but over time comes to prefer the 
direction of the best improvement. The direction selection process is controlled by a sort 
of temporal parameter, which is usually called the ‘temperature’ by analogy with real 
annealing. SA approaches require a schedule representation as well as a neighbourhood 
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operator for moving from the current solution to a candidate solution. Annealing methods 
allow jumps to worse solutions and thus often avoid local sub-optimal solutions 
(Kirkpatrick et al., 1983). The quality of solutions produced by an SA implementation 
depends on the correct choice of solution space and neighbourhood, as well as of the 
parameters that govern the cooling schedule. SA has been applied to service scheduling for 
several years. Gunawan et al. (2007) used a hybrid algorithm which consists of an integer 
programming, a greedy heuristic and a modified SA algorithm for solving large-scale 
timetabling problems. Bailey et al. (1997) solved a nurse scheduling problem using SA and 
compared its performance with integer programming and with a GA. They found that, for 
a given quality, their algorithm was faster than the GA and integer programming for the 
set of nurse scheduling testing problems. 
2.2.3 Tabu search 
Tabu search (TS) is similar to SA in that it also moves from one schedule to another, 
with the next schedule being possibly worse than the one before it. The difference is in the 
mechanism by which the moves to new schedules are accepted. A TS maintains a list of 
tabu moves, representing schedules which, having been visited recently, are forbidden in 
order to diversify the directions in which search proceeds. TS has been proposed to 
compute high-complexity large-sized health care service scheduling. Dowsland (1998) 
used tabu search with strategic oscillation for nurse scheduling. The objective is to ensure 
an adequate number of nurses are on duty at all times while incorporating individual 
preferences and requests for days off in a way that is seen to be fair to all nurses. The 
method uses a variant of TS which oscillates between solutions with feasible nurse 
coverage and then applies nurses’ preferences to improve the solution. Demeester et al. 
(2010) proposed a hybrid TS algorithm for patient admission scheduling. It automatically 
assigns patients to beds in the appropriate departments by considering patients’ medical 
needs as well as their preferences, while keeping the number of patients in the different 
departments balanced. The method uses a TS algorithm hybridized with a token-ring and 
a variable neighbourhood-descent algorithm. TS has also been applied to university course 
timetabling problems (Hertz, 1991; Hertz, 1992). 
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2.2.4 Constraint logic programming 
Many service scheduling problems can be modelled as constraint satisfaction problems 
(CSP). In a CSP, values which satisfy a set of constraints must be found for a set of discrete 
variables with finite domains. Constraint satisfaction is a search procedure that operates in 
the space of constraint sets rather than in that of solution sets.  Constraint Logic 
Programming (CLP) provides the ability to declare variables and their domains for CSPs. 
Examples of applying CLP to service scheduling problems can be found in Gueret et al. 
(1995), Henz and Wurtz (1995), and Abdennadher and Schlenker (1999). 
2.2.5 Approaches considering customer preferences and dynamic environments 
Due to the computational complexity involved in creating schedules that 
simultaneously consider customer preferences and scheduling objectives, there has been 
limited research in centralized service scheduling that considers customer preferences. 
Wang and Gupta (2011) proposed a heuristic approach for patient scheduling which 
captures customer preferences. Their method has two components. The first one 
dynamically learns a patient’s preferences and updates estimates of acceptance 
probabilities. The second one uses the acceptance probability information to make booking 
decisions. Jaumard et al. (1998) proposed an integer programming model accommodating 
nurses’ work preferences. The problem was solved using Dantzig-Wolfe decomposition. 
The objective was to minimize salary costs and maximize the nurses’ preferences. Azaiez 
and Sharif (2005) developed a 0-1 linear goal programming model for nurse scheduling. 
They obtained the nurses’ preferences for shift times from a survey consisting of 15 
multiple choice questions. The nurses’ preferences were combined with hospital 
constraints to develop their linear goal programming model.  
Centralized service scheduling usually deals with dynamic environments by using 
simulation-based approaches. A simulation is the imitation of the operation of a real-world 
process or system over time (Groothuis & Merode, 2001). An advantage of simulation 
studies over heuristic approaches is the ability to model complex systems and represent 
environmental variables. Hancock and Walter (1984) conducted a simulation study based 
on historical data of patient arrivals. The simulation was used to determine the number of 
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procedures that would be performed each day of the week. Groothuis and Merode (2001) 
applied the discrete event simulation technique to optimize the use of catheterization 
capacity in a hospital. Ho and Lau (1999) proposed a simulation-based method for 
evaluating the impact of different combinations of dynamic environmental factors such as 
no-shows, service times, and the number of customers per service session on the quality of 
service schedules. 
The above-mentioned traditional scheduling methods encounter great difficulties when 
they are applied to real-world situations, as   they use simplified theoretical models and are 
essentially centralized in the sense that all computations are carried out in a central 
computing unit. The intelligent agent technologies, on the other hand, suggest an 
innovative, lightweight approach to scheduling problems. The main characteristic of 
intelligent agents is their autonomy. Each agent makes its own decisions, based on its 
internal state and on the information it receives from its environment; thus, each agent can 
keep its independency from the rest of system. In other words, each agent, according to its 
own private information, may use a different policy independently from the rest of the 
system. Agent-based systems are inherently distributed and robust in dynamic 
environments. Agents can retrieve information from different resources, analyze it, filter 
redundant information, select and then present the data by means of an interface that is 
attractive to users. Another feature of agents is their sociability; agents can communicate 
with each other and exchange any kind of information. This sociability, makes it possible 
for them to overcome any inconsistency among their local schedules and resolve errors and 
collaborate in the process of scheduling. Based on the properties of agent-based systems, 
an agent-based approach should be a good candidate for service scheduling problem. 
2.3 Agent-based Scheduling 
Agent-based scheduling can be defined as an approach in which scheduling problem 
are decomposed among local decision makers who may have conflicting objectives but 
who coordinate with each other through certain communication mechanism to achieve 
overall system objectives. Local decision makers are called agents (Sycara et al. 1991, 
Kouiss et al. 1997, Shen 2001). Agents’ properties include autonomy, so they can operate 
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without human interaction, a social ability to communicate with other agents, pro-
activeness, which allows them to take on an initiative role, and reactivity, to respond to 
changes in the system (Rahimifard and Newman 1998). 
Agent-based scheduling has received considerable attention in manufacturing areas 
(Burke and Prosser 1991, Chung et al. 1996, Maturana and Norrie 1996), and it has also 
been applied to other application domains such as network power scheduling and packet 
scheduling (Chiussi and Francini 2000, Hohlt et al. 2004, Vaidya et al. 2005). Supply chain 
optimisation is also another important application area for agent-based scheduling. (Tsay 
et al.2000, Lau et al. 2005a, 2005b, Frayret 2009).  
Several papers provide reviews of the literature on agent-based scheduling (Sen 1997, 
Tharumarajah 2001, Shen 2002, Caridi and Cavalieri 2004, Giret and Botti 2004, Shen et 
al. 2006). Tharumarajah (2001) provides a classification for the literature based on the 
following attributes: problem decomposition, problem-solving organisation, coordination 
and control. Problem decomposition describes how the global scheduling problem is 
decomposed between multiple decision makers (i.e. agents). Problem decomposition 
approaches are categorized based on three views: resource view, task view and hybrid 
view. The other two attributes focus on how agents communicate and cooperate with each 
other in order to achieve improved global performance. Shen (2002) classifieds the 
reviewed papers in terms of four issues in agent-based manufacturing scheduling. Shen et 
al. (2006) extended that work to include studies on agent-based approaches to 
manufacturing process planning. The issues are identified as agent encapsulation, 
coordination and negotiation protocols, system architectures and decision schemes for 
individual agents. Caridi and Cavalieri (2004) propose a taxonomy that includes 
application domain, agent, control, organisation and communication for classifying multi-
agent systems. .  
This section provides a brief literature review and classifies the papers based on three 
attributes: information flow structure, communication mechanism and schedule generation. 
With respect to information flow structure, the literature can further be classified into two 
main groups: mediated structure and autonomous structure. In a mediated structure there 
is a coordinator agent that other agents communicate through. Each agent makes its own 
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local schedule considering its goals, and then communicates that schedule to the 
coordinator agent. The coordinator agent evaluates the local schedules with respect to the 
overall system objectives, resolves potential conflicts, and finalizes the scheduling 
decisions. The scheduling system proposed by Lau et al. (2005) has a mediated structure. 
Their supply chain is modelled as a multi-agent system, with three types of agent: project 
agent, contractor agent and middle agent. Companies aim at completing a project, which 
consists of a network of operations that act as project agents, and contractor agents offer 
their bids for performing those operations. A middle agent facilitates and coordinates the 
scheduling process between project agents and contractor agents. Babayan and He (2004) 
use a mediated structure for scheduling jobs in a flexible flow shop. In this system, local 
agents correspond to the jobs, while a manager agent decides whether rescheduling should 
be performed at any point and sets the rules of the game. Cooperative game theory is used 
to regulate the competition among the agents for scheduling their jobs. The game consists 
of two steps. The first step determines the agents that are eligible to schedule their jobs, 
and the second step enables competition among the agents by allowing them to schedule 
their jobs. Wang et al. (2009) solve the job shop scheduling problem by using auction 
theory. Their proposed system consists of two types of agents: job agents and resource 
agents. Job agents are associated with each job and they participate in the auction to process 
their jobs. Each bid includes a latest completion time and the price for completing a job 
before a specified time. A resource agent is associated with all of the resources in a job 
shop; it is considered as a mediator agent that can determine the resource   allocation to the 
job agents that maximizes the sum of bidder prices.   
In an autonomous structure, agents communicate directly with each other, and the 
interactions between agents are not coordinated by mediator agents. Duffie and Prabhu 
(1994) use an autonomous structure for manufacturing systems. Each resource is assigned 
to an agent. The information regarding a new job is passed to resource agents when a job 
arrives. The resource agents affected by the arrival of this job develop alternative 
scheduling plans. Scheduling plans may conflict because resource agents act 
independently. One or more agents discover the conflicts and send a feedback report to the 
local agents. With this feedback, local agents develop alternative local plans. In a study by 
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Sycara et al. (1991), each local agent determines its overall demand in time for each 
resource and presents this data to the resource agents. After receiving all the demands from 
the local agents, each resource agent starts to schedule the most critical operations. The 
peak of the aggregate demand determines the critical operations. The critical operations are 
scheduled based on the survivability measure. After scheduling each operation, local agents 
update their demand information. Information exchange between local agents and resource 
agents continues iteratively until a feasible schedule has been achieved.   
With respect to the second classification attribute, communication mechanism, the 
literature can be broken into three main groups: Contract-Net protocol, economic models, 
and iterative refinement. In the communication mechanism based on Contract-Net 
protocol, a new job broadcasts its arrival and requests bids for its processing. The agents 
(cells or machines) prepare bids. The best bid is selected by a manager agent according to 
some criteria. Smith (1980), Smith and Davis (1981), Parunak (1987), Shaw and Whinston 
(1988) and Lima et al. (2006) are examples of studies that apply the Contract-Net protocol 
to the communication mechanism between agents.  
Several economic models that support distributed rational decision making were 
studied in Sandholm (1999); among them, auction is the most relevant to scheduling. 
Auctions assume game-theoretic agent behavior. The equilibrium state is defined by the 
condition that agents play a best-response strategy to each other and cannot benefit from a 
unilateral deviation to an alternative strategy. In Kutanoglu and Wu (1999), iterative 
auctions are applied to the job shop scheduling problem. The focus is to investigate the 
links between combinatorial auctions and Lagrangean relaxation, and then to design 
auctions based on Lagrangean-based decomposition. In MacKie-Mason et al., (2004) and 
Wellman et al., (2003), price prediction and bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions 
are studied in the setting of market-based scheduling. Simultaneous auctions sell multiple 
goods in separate markets simultaneously. Agents have to interact with simultaneous but 
distinct markets in order to obtain a combination of resources sufficient to accomplish their 




The third communication mechanism is iterative refinement. In this mechanism, 
scheduling information is exchanged between agents to eliminate conflicts and to revise an 
existing schedule to achieve better system performance (Sycara et al., 1991, Liu and 
Sycara, 1993). In Liu and Sycara (1993), the resource agents generate initial schedules 
using the earliest due date rule. Since resource agents act independently, any generated 
schedule may violate precedence constraints. A coordinator agent extract the information 
about the operation of each job and send it to the local agent. Next, the local agent identifies 
and eliminates any precedence violations. The procedure continues in an iterative manner 
until a feasible schedule is generated. In later studies, the same authors propose 
mechanisms for loop prevention (Sycara and Liu 1994, 1995).   
The third attribute applied to classify the literature, schedule generation, describes how 
the sub-problems are solved by the agents. Bid preparation (Yang et al. 1993), dispatching 
rules (Kouiss et al. 1997, Hadavi et al. 1992), heuristic methods (Sycara et al. 1991, 
Trentesaux et al. 1998), constraint-based branch and bound (Wang et al. 2009) and mixed 
integer programming (Babayan and He 2004) are some of the methods found in the 
literature. 
  It is important to emphasise that, although there are several review papers on agent-
based scheduling, there is no survey of the literature covering agent-based service 
scheduling. The next section provides that review of agent based service scheduling. 
2.4 Agent-Based Service Scheduling  
Agent-based service scheduling is essentially a distributed approach that is flexible, 
efficient, and adaptable to real-world dynamic environments. By applying agent-based 
service scheduling architecture, the distributed nature of service scheduling can be 
modelled naturally. In addition, each agent can be assigned different objectives. In this 
way, the complicated multiple objectives in service scheduling can be decomposed to 
individual agents. This decomposition significantly simplifies the modelling of the 
objectives. Agent-based scheduling systems have been proposed for several important 
service sectors. However, there is a lack of general problem formulations, classifications, 
solution frameworks, and test beds in service scheduling. Therefore a domain-specific 
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approach is applied here. Several representative application domains are reviewed through 
the lens of how agent-based scheduling addresses service scheduling challenges. Since the 
challenges of distributed scheduling information and complicated multiple objectives have 
been naturally modelled in agent-oriented design paradigms, in this section, the focus is on 
how agent-based scheduling addresses the challenges of dynamic environments and users' 
private information. 
2.4.1 Meeting scheduling 
A meeting scheduling problem signifies a decision-making process affecting several 
users, in which it is necessary to decide “when” and “where” one or more meetings should 
be scheduled (Hassine et al., 2004). Since it usually involves inputs from multiple users, 
meeting scheduling can be classified as a service scheduling problem. Agent-based 
meeting scheduling approaches have been proposed in the literature. Some of them are 
distributed implementations of constraint-satisfaction algorithms in the multi-agent 
systems environment. In the multi-agent meeting scheduling system developed by Franzin 
et al. (2002), agents communicate over several proposal phases. Whenever agents 
communicate during the proposal phases, the information they exchange can be used to 
build an approximation of the constraint set(s) of the other agents. In other words, each 
agent in the proposal phase is able to elicit other agents’ availabilities. To deal with the 
challenge of a dynamic environment, Hassine et al. (2004) formalize meeting scheduling 
as a dynamic valued-constraint satisfaction problem. Agents negotiate with each other to 
achieve a schedule that maximizes global utility. In the negotiation process, a host agent 
proposes a set of time slots as a solution to the other agents who will participate in the 
meeting. Each participant agent that has received this message ranks the obtained time slots 
according to its preferences and constraints and returns them to the proposer/host agent. 
The host/proposer agent tries to find the best solution, one which maximizes its utility, 
from the received time slots. The same process continues until an agreement is reached 
among all of the agents. Course timetabling at universities, which can be seen as a type of 
meeting scheduling problem, is modelled as a constraint satisfaction problem by Meisels 
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et al. (2003). An inter-agent negotiation protocol is used to overcome inconsistencies 
among local schedules.  
The presence of users’ private information is also addressed in agent-based meeting 
scheduling. Wainer et al. (2007) defined four levels of privacy protocol (or modes of 
agents’ interaction) to model users’ private information, namely, full information, 
approval, voting and the suggestion protocol. These modes of interaction are defined based 
on whether the participants are comfortable sharing their private information during the 
negotiation process with the host or not. In Modi et al. (2005), the agents’ private 
information is modelled as their utilities. Each agent makes a decision about accepting a 
meeting time based on how the decision will impact its own utility. The utility of a time 
slot is calculated based on the difference between the value of a meeting scheduled in the 
time slot and the predicted cost of continued negotiating with other agents.  
Crawford et al. (2004) designed a mechanism for meeting scheduling which is 
incentive-compatible. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if it is every agent’s dominant 
strategy to reveal their private utility values truthfully. The mechanism motivates agents to 
reveal their valuation for each of the feasible schedules. The schedule that maximizes the 
social welfare is selected. Each agent’s payments are VCG auction payments, which 
justifies the incentive compatibility of the mechanism. Iterative auction are also used in 
agent-based meeting scheduling.  In a course timetabling system proposed by Sönmez and 
Ünver (2007), students are assigned a certain amount of bid endowments which they use 
to bid for different schedules of courses. Students are modelled as price-takers under a 
belief system. In other words, students’ bids are based on their guess about the market-
clearing price they will face. Krishna and Ünver (2007) also proposed a course bidding 
system and conducted a field test in the spring 2004 semester at the Ross School of 
Business, University of Michigan. In their bidding system, student bids are used to infer 
students’ preferences for courses and to determine their course priorities. In addition to 
handling users' private information, the challenge of dynamic environments is addressed 




The agent-based approach, in which patients and hospital resources are modelled as 
autonomous agents with their own goals, reflects the decentralized structures of the health 
care environment. Most of the agent-based healthcare scheduling literature focuses on the 
challenge of the distributed and dynamic environment of healthcare management. In a 
recent study of operation room scheduling, Zhiming (2011) developed a two-stage 
approach which addresses the challenges of dynamic scheduling. Mixed integer 
programming is used in the first stage for assigning surgical operations to each operation 
room. The second stage utilizes a dynamic rescheduling approach, in which agents 
reallocate tasks using the contract net protocol in a way that minimizes the cost of the 
operation rooms.  
Agent-based approaches have also been proposed for patient scheduling. Hannebauer 
et al. (2001) formulated patient scheduling as a distributed constraint optimization problem. 
They proposed a Multi-phase Agreement Finding (MPAF) algorithm for coordinating the 
agents and covering the constraints. The MPAF consists of two phases, the proposal phase 
and the assignment phase. In the proposal phase, a diagnostic unit agent selects a set of 
feasible appointment time slots based on its optimization criteria and proposes these to the 
patient agent. In the assignment phase, the patient agent decides whether to accept the 
proposed time slots. This decision is made based on the agent’s scheduling constraints and 
its scheduling objective, which is to minimize the waiting time between appointments. 
Other agent-based patient scheduling approaches model the scheduling environment as a 
market. Given the distributed and dynamic nature of patient scheduling, markets can 
efficiently distribute scarce resources among patients. Paulussen et al. (2003) developed a 
bidding mechanism for patient scheduling, in which patient agents communicate their 
(private) utility for certain time slots of a resource via a price mechanism. The price that 
patient agents are willing to pay is the difference between the cost-value of the current 
allocation and the cost-value for the desired appointment. Resources are assigned to the 
patients that are willing to pay the highest price (to the patients who gain the highest health 
sate improvement). The scheduling objective is to maximize resource utilization and 
minimize patient’s hospital time. For patients who need to schedule several related 
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appointments, a multi-round auction mechanism is proposed by Hosseini et al. (2011). In 
this approach, patients calculate the value of obtaining each resource by solving their 
Markov decision problem. In each auction round, agents submit their bids; the auctioneer 
determines the winner and then moves to the next step. The objective of winner 
determination is to minimize the global regret values of patients. A patient’s regret value 
on a resource is defined as the difference in value between getting the resource and not 
getting the resource, given a patient’s current health state.  
Agent-based approaches have also been proposed for nurse timetabling. Grano et al. 
(2009) proposed an auction-based nurse scheduling approach that considers both nurse 
preferences and hospital requirements. In the auction, nurses bid for their work shifts and 
rest days using points instead of money values. The nurses’ private information, which 
consists of their availability and preferences for specific days and shifts, are thereby 
obtained in the bidding stage. Winners are selected using an optimization model which 
seeks to award shifts to the highest bidders while simultaneously meeting hospital 
requirements. 
2.4.3 Transportation 
An agent-based approach have been adopted in transportation planning and scheduling 
research for more than two decades. Fischer et al. (1995) pointed out that transportation 
planning and scheduling are inherently distributed, complex tasks. Geographically, trucks 
and jobs are distributed and maintain some level of autonomy. To implement traditional 
methods, a scheduler must gather a large amount of information to a central place where 
the solution can be computed. However, using an agent-based approach, an agent only 
requires local information. In their review on multi-agent systems in logistics, Lang et al. 
(2008) concluded that transportation planning and scheduling problems have specifications 
that comply with the particular capabilities of agent systems. Specifically, these systems 
are able to deal with inter-organizational and event-driven scheduling settings that meet a 
supply chain’s planning and execution requirements. Davidsson et al. (2005) also identified 
a number of the positive aspects of the agent-based approaches to logistics. Existing 
surveys (Lang et al., 2008; Davidsson et al., 2005) mainly focus on research addressing the 
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distributed and dynamic aspects of transportation services.  The rest of this section provides 
a review of papers focusing on the challenge of the presence of customers’ private 
information, which is mainly tackled by the design of the various auction systems in the 
context of multi-agent systems.  
Auction mechanisms, especially combinatorial auctions, have been adopted by a large 
number of shippers and 3PL (third-party logistic) providers. Leading companies such as 
Wal-Mart, Procter & Gamble and Sears have used combinatorial auctions to reduce their 
logistic costs (Sheffi, 2004). Song et al. (2003) proposed an auction-based mechanism, the 
Collaborative Carrier Network, for carriers to exchange their excess capacities in a TL 
(truckload) spot-market. Through this network, carriers can buy and sell transportation 
capacities. The network is structured as a group of auctions launched by carriers. Each 
carrier can be both a contractor and a sub-contractor in different auctions. A carrier will 
launch, at most, one auction at a time, and if new loads come in during the previous auction 
round, they will be simply held and until the next round. The network attempts to ease the 
exchange of information, lower transaction costs and make it possible for both carriers and 
shippers to access larger markets.  
Kwon et al. (2005) proposed an iterative auction mechanism for TL transportation 
procurement. Each agent (carrier) bids for a package of lanes. A descending multi-round 
format is used to allocate the lane packages to agents. Agents compute their preferred 
packages based on their cost structures and submit them to the auctioneer. The auctioneer 
then performs a provisional allocation of lanes to the agents by solving a winner 
determination (WD) problem with the objective of minimizing the payments. Simulation 
results have indicated that both carriers and shippers reduced their cost through a better 
collaboration.  
For the LTL (less than truckload) setting, Krajewska et al. (2006) proposed an auction 
model for the collaboration among individual freight forwarding entities. Cooperating 
forwarders exchange their orders through a combinatorial auction. The auction is 
individually rational, which means each individual partner increases their profit by 
participating in the coalition. 
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Effective collaboration among agents in a distributed system leads to a better utilization 
of resources and, thus, greater efficiency and profit for the whole system. However, before 
entering into the partnership, agents have to agree upon how to share the profit that results 
from the collaboration. In a collaborative environment where, for example, carrier 
companies belong to a common holding organization, profit sharing may not require 
incentive-compatible mechanisms. Gujo et al. (2009) proposed an exchange mechanism, 
called ComEx, for inter-enterprise logistic services. In ComEx, transportation capacity in 
each division is managed by a profit centre which can exchange delivery orders with other 
profit centres based on the geographical zones and time windows of the orders. The profit 
gained is shared proportionally among the profit centres based on the cost savings of each 
centre that participated in the exchange. A profit precondition for this type of sharing is 
that ComEx has access to the cost saving data of the profit centres. ComEx works well in 
a collaborative setting. However it is not suitable for game theoretic settings where profit 
centres do not belong to a common holding organization and so they may be reluctant to 
share their cost savings data. In this case, a profit distribution mechanism based on game 
theory and combinatorial auction should be applied (Krajewska et al., 2006; Gomber et al., 
1997).  Other agent-based models in transportation services distribute the benefits of 
collaboration from a loss-sharing rather than a profit-sharing perspective (Schönberger, 
2005; Schönsleben et al., 2004). Krajewska et al. (2006) presents an overview of these 
benefit sharing models. 
2.4.4 Computing 
Modern computing services aggregate a large number of independent computing and 
communication resources and data stores. They are built onto the bases of distributed 
computing, grid computing and virtualization. A computing service environment is 
inherently complex, heterogeneous and dynamic. Service resource management systems 
need to provide mechanisms and tools that allow resource consumers (end users) and 
providers (resource owners) to express their requirements and facilitate the realization of 
their goals. This objective necessitates seamless scheduling of providers’ resources to 
support the dynamic scaling of user activities across multiple domains. Scheduling 
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computing services under varying loads, diverse application requirements and 
heterogeneous systems is a challenging problem. An agent-based approach can be an 
effective way to realize information sharing, given the unpredictable dynamism and 
increasing heterogeneity in computing service scheduling.  
With the aim of tackling the challenge of dynamic environments in computing services, 
An et al. (2010) proposed a distributed negotiation mechanism for dynamic and uncertain 
resource demand and supply in computing as a service (cloud computing) platforms. The 
mechanism is an extension to the alternating offers protocol with the added feature of 
allowing agents to decommit from contracts at a cost. The mechanism facilitates the agents’ 
negotiation over both a contract price and a decommitment penalty. They evaluated their 
approach experimentally using representative scenarios and workloads, which showed that 
their model achieves a higher level of social welfare compared to both combinatorial 
auctions and the fixed-price model used by Amazon’s EC2.  
Scheduling mechanisms for computing services typically deal with the dynamics of 
both resource and service markets. Sim (2012) proposed a concurrent negotiation 
mechanism for agents to negotiate in multiple interrelated e-Markets.  He developed an 
agent-based test bed consisting of provider agents and consumer agents acting on behalf of 
resource providers and consumers, respectively, along with a set of broker agents. The 
mechanism consists of: (1) a bargaining-position-estimation strategy for the multilateral 
negotiations between consumer and broker agents in a service market, and (2) a regression-
based coordination strategy for concurrent negotiations between broker and provider 
agents in resource markets. The negotiation outcomes between broker and provider agents 
in a resource market can potentially influence the negotiation outcomes between broker 
and consumer agents in a service market. Using this mechanism, the broker agent accepts 
service requests from consumer agents, and purchases resources from provider agents. The 
collection of resources that satisfy consumer agents' requirements is composed 
dynamically. Mobile agents are also designed in this way, providing scalability in cloud 
computing. In Singh and Malhotra (2012), a mobile agent is capable of transporting its 
state from one environment to another with its data intact and able to perform appropriately 
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in its new environment. The agents are supported with algorithms to search for another 
cloud with better response time when the most-approachable cloud becomes overloaded.  
To deal with the challenge of customer’s private information, game-theoretic based 
methods have been proposed to solve the resource allocation problem in network systems. 
Gagliano et al. (1995) presented an auction allocation of computing resources. In their 
proposed auction, computing tasks are provided sufficient intelligence to acquire resources 
by offering, bidding and exchanging them for funds.  Wolski et al. (2001) compared 
commodities markets and auctions in grids in terms of price stability and market 
equilibrium. Zaman and Grosu (2011) studied and implemented combinatorial auction-
based mechanisms for efficient provisioning and allocation of computing services (VM 
instances) in cloud computing environments, with the objectives of maximizing the 
revenue of the service provider and providing an efficient allocation of resources. A recent 
survey on market-oriented resource management and scheduling in computing services can 
be found in Garg and Buyya (2011). 
Table 2-1 summarizes the agent-based scheduling approaches aimed at addressing service 
scheduling challenges. 
Table 2-1 Agent-based scheduling approaches that address service scheduling challenges 
Agent-based service 
scheduling approaches 
Dynamic environment objective 
 
Private information 
Franzin et al., (2002), P. 
Modi et al., (2005), 
Crawford et al., (2004), 
Krishna and Ünver (2004), 





Maximize the social welfare by 





Hassine et al., (2004), 
T.Sönmez and M.Ünver 
(2006), 
Addressed Maximizing the global utility and 
ensuring near fulfillment of 
customers’ preferences 
Not Addressed 
Zhiming(2011) Addressed Minimize the cost of the 
operation rooms including the 
overtime cost  
Not Addressed 
Wainer et al., (2007) Not Addressed Minimize the cost of the 





Muller et al., (2001), 
Hosseini et al., (2011) 
Not addressed Maximize patient satisfaction by 
considering patient preferences 
and minimize patient waiting 
time between appointments 
Addressed 
Paulussen et al., (2003)  
Addressed 
Maximize the resource utilization 
and minimize patient’s hospital 
stay time  
 
Not addressed 
Meisels et al. (2003), 
Hannebauer et al. (2001) 
Not addressed Minimize the patients’ waiting 
time between appointments 
Not addressed 
Kwon et al., (2005), 
Krajewska et al. (2006), 
Sheffi, 2004, Song et al. 
(2003) 
Not addressed Minimize the total shipping cost Addressed 
An et al. (2010), Sim (2012) Addressed Maximize the social welfare Not addressed 
Gagliano et al. (1995), 
Zaman and Grosu (2011), 
Wolski et al. (2001) 
Not addressed Maximizing the revenue of the 
service provider as well as 




2.5 System Design Issues  
Adopting the agent-based approach has made it possible to model the challenges of a 
distributed environment and complicated multiple objectives in service scheduling 
naturally in the agent-oriented architecture. The main design issue is how to design agent-
based scheduling systems such that they can effectively address the challenges of a 
dynamic scheduling environment and the presence of customers’ private information. The 
previous section reviewed typical agent-based scheduling approaches aimed at addressing 
these challenges from a domain-specific perspective. This section presents a summary of 
the existing agent-based service scheduling approaches from the system design perspective 
and identifies some promising research opportunities. 
2.5.1  System structures  
Most of the available agent-based service scheduling system designs adopt the physical 
decomposition approach for agent encapsulation. Service providers who control the service 
resources are modelled as provider agents, and users who request services are modelled as 
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customer agents. In some cases, such as carrier collaboration in transportation services, a 
service provider can also request services from other providers. In this situation, a service 
provider will play the role of provider agent as well as that of customer agent. Given the 
agent encapsulation scheme, agent system architectures provide the organizing framework 
within which agents interact with each other. In the context of agent-based service 
scheduling, two types of system structures are usually adopted, namely mediated structure 
and autonomous structure. A mediated structure utilizes a mediator to coordinate the 
allocation of resources to users. A service provider agent often assumes the role of 
mediator. For example, in healthcare scheduling, provider (resource) agents usually take 
the role of mediator and coordinate the resource allocation among patients (Paulussen et 
al., 2003; Hannebauer and Muller, 2001; Hosseini et al., 2001).  
Autonomous structure appears in the settings, where a service provider also requires 
services from other providers, that is, an agent is both a provider and a customer. In 
autonomous structure, interactions between agents are not coordinated by mediator agents. 
Instead, agents optimize their schedules by exchanging their resources (Krajewska and 
Kopfer, 2006, Gujo et al., 2009). In some service scheduling settings, such as meeting 
scheduling or workforce scheduling, there are no explicit resource times to be allocated. 
Instead, the main issue is to find a meeting time or work schedule which is agreeable to all 
participants. For example, in Becker and Hans (2006), agents representing operation room 
staffs negotiate with each other, based on the Nash bargaining solution, to schedule their 
work shifts. Autonomous structure is also often used in agent-based meeting scheduling 
applications (Hassine et al., 2004, Modi et  al., 2004, and Franzin et al., 2002). 
2.5.2  Negotiation mechanisms  
Given its inherently decentralized nature, agent-based service scheduling must 
coordinate agents’ behaviour using some type of negotiation protocol. The most commonly 
used protocols are the Contract Net protocol (CNP) and economic based models, such as 
auctions. CNP is essentially a general tendering procedure. However, unlike auctions, the 
awarding decision may not be related to price or cost factors. To summarize, in the CNP, 
each agent (manager) with work to subcontract broadcasts a call for bidding messages and 
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waits for other agents (contractors) to send back their bids. After receiving bids from all 
the agents or waiting for a certain time period, the manager evaluates the bids received 
based on the evaluation criteria and awards its contracts to one or more contractors, which 
then process the subtask. CNP coordinates task allocation, providing dynamic allocation 
and natural load balancing. Unlike general equilibrium market mechanisms or auctions, 
which usually require a mediator, contract nets are purely distributed models, in which any 
agent can act as a manager and subcontract tasks to other agents. CNP can easily be 
embedded into the autonomous system structure and is suitable for distributed dynamic 
scheduling. For example, in Zhiming (2011), CNP is used to dynamically reallocate tasks 
among agents in an operation room scheduling setting. The drawback of CNP is that there 
is no built-in mechanism to motivate agents to reveal their private information. Therefore, 
it is not sufficient in service scheduling settings where customers’ private information is 
present.  
Auctions can accommodate customers’ preferences to minimally reveal their private 
information by providing appropriate incentives to customers. There is a wealth of 
literature on auction design. Different auction formats such as sequential auctions, 
simultaneous auctions and combinatorial auctions have been studied extensively.  
Agent-based service scheduling usually uses combinatorial auctions (also called bundle 
auctions), because scheduling is, in its essence, a combinatorial optimization problem. 
Typical examples include various implementations of VCG auctions (Crawford & Veloso, 
2004; Sheffi, 2004; Berger and Bierwirth, 2010). However, due to high computational 
complexity, VCG is not practical for large-scale problems, especially in dynamic 
environments. To provide better responsiveness, sequential auctions, simultaneous 
auctions and iterative implementations of combinatorial auctions have also been adopted 
in service scheduling (Paulussen et al., 2003; Song and Regan, 2003; Sönmez & Ünver, 
2007; Kwon et al., 2005; Gujo et al. 2009). These auction models are compared and their 
applicability to agent-based service scheduling is analysed in the following subsection.  
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2.6 Research opportunities  
This chapter provides a survey on system design for service process scheduling,   
covering several representative service domains. The approaches reviewed here focus on 
either dynamic scheduling environments or customers’ private information. These 
approaches may not be sufficient for many real world service scheduling applications, as 
they usually deal with only part of the challenges. Based on this survey, as well as on first-
hand research and development experience in this area, I believe that further research on 
an integrated approach that tackles service scheduling challenges concurrently is very 
much needed. While there is no built-in mechanism in CNP to address customers’ private 
information, a logical step to the integrated approach is to design auctions which can 
accommodate dynamic changes and handle bundles of resource requirements in service 
scheduling. The key issue is how to deal with the enormous computational complexities of 
combinatorial auctions in dynamic environments. 
 In general auction terms, combinatorial auctions (CA) allow bidders to place bids on 
bundles of items. It addresses bundle preferences explicitly. However, the computations 
required to solve difficult valuation problems and winner-determination problems can be 
prohibitive. In general, CAs are likely to be practical for smaller-sized problems. In 
addition, CAs require that a complete valuation on alternative schedules be revealed to the 
auctioneer. In service scheduling, customers are often reluctant to make a complete 
revelation to prevent any information from leaking out and adversely affecting other 
decisions or negotiations. Lack of transparency is another practical concern in CAs. It can 
be difficult to explain to customers why a certain schedule has been selected. 
Iterative bundle auctions are iterative implementations of CAs. This class of auction 
has practical significance because it addresses the computational and informational 
complexities of CAs by allowing bidders to reveal their preference information only as 
necessary as the auction proceeds, and bidders are not required to submit (and compute) 
complete and exact information about their private valuations. In many cases, iterative 
auctions present better computational and privacy properties than those of CAs. In addition, 
iterative auctions have the potential to accommodate dynamic events, which is an important 
requirement in service scheduling applications. With a careful design of the structure and 
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its components, iterative bundle auctions have the potential to significantly reduce 
computational costs while accommodating the dynamic environment and users’ private 
information in service scheduling.  
Differently from how CAs and their iterative implementations price bundles, sequential 
and simultaneous auctions price bundles as the sum price of the individual items. However, 
they do not allow bidders to bid on bundles of items. Sequential auctions suppose that the 
set of items is auctioned in sequence. Bidders bid for items in a specific known order and 
can choose how much (and whether) to bid for an item depending on past successes, 
failures, prices and so on. Sequential auctions are particularly useful in situations where 
setting up combinatorial or simultaneous auctions is not feasible. Simultaneous auctions 
sell multiple items simultaneously in separate markets. Bidders have to interact with 
simultaneous but distinct markets in order to obtain a combination of items sufficient to 
accomplish their task. Real-world markets quite typically operate separately and 
concurrently despite significant interactions in their preferences. Sequential and 
simultaneous auctions tackle the complementarities over resources in the spirit of general 
equilibrium theory. These auctions fail when there are no prices that support an efficient 
solution (the existence problem) and when agents bid cautiously to avoid purchasing an 
incomplete bundle (the exposure problem). However, given that these auctions are more 
practical in terms of computation, they are important models worthy of further study.  
In addition to the design of core negotiation mechanisms, other research needs remain 
to be addressed in agent-based service scheduling. For example, there is a lack of 
systematic analysis and comparison on how system design factors affect computational 
time in agent-based service scheduling systems. To adequately test and evaluate various 
approaches, benchmark problems are also needed. Furthermore, the systems must be 
designed to integrate a wide range of real-time information and uncertain parameters into 
the dynamic service scheduling process. Unlike the auction designs found in the literature, 
dynamic pricing cannot be applied to some services, such as healthcare and government 
services. These settings require bidding-based service scheduling systems without dynamic 




Service scheduling systems are inherently distributed and dynamic. The presence of 
customers’ private information imposes additional challenges in finding high quality 
solutions. Agent-based systems can be an appropriate approach to service scheduling due 
to their distributed and autonomous nature. This chapter reviewed agent-based scheduling 
approaches in representative service domains through the lens of how they address the 
challenges of service scheduling. Despite the many domain-specific design applications in 
agent-based service scheduling, there is a lack of general problem formulations, 
classifications and solution frameworks. Constructing these general models for service 
scheduling will greatly facilitate the collaboration of researchers in this area and guide the 
effective development of integrated service scheduling systems. Moreover, the 
applicability of a service scheduling approach to industrial settings will largely depend on 
how it copes with distributed and dynamic environments and on how it computes high-
quality solutions despite the presence of customers’ private information. 
The position taken in this thesis is to develop service scheduling approaches based on 
an iterative implementation of VCG auction. Since agents are not required to submit (and 
compute) complete and exact information about their private valuations, in many cases, 
iterative auctions present improved computational and privacy properties. In addition, 
iterative auctions have the potential to support dynamic scheduling, a common requirement 
in service scheduling. By carefully investigating the features of iterative combinatorial 
auctions and the nature of service scheduling problems, an effective and practical auction-
based service scheduling approach can be developed. Compared to the existing agent-based 
scheduling literature, this work is focused on an integrated framework that simultaneously 
addresses a dynamic distributed environment and customers’ private information. In 





Chapter 3 The Service Scheduling Problem  
Compared with traditional manufacturing scheduling, service scheduling poses 
additional challenges attributable to the significant customer involvement in service 
processes.  Service scheduling should be generated in a distributed environment where the 
scheduling knowledge is distributed among customers and service providers. 
 Customers have jobs that need to be processed. In order to have their jobs processed, 
customers need to consume the processing time of the service providers’ resources. The 
price that customers are willing to pay to a service provider and their preferences regarding 
the allocated service time slot can be their private information and they may be reluctant 
to fully reveal that information to a provider. Customers may behave strategically to protect 
their private information attributed to the different objectives of service providers and 
customers. With the advances in information technology, service scheduling has become a 
common requirement in many real-world automated trading systems. Clarifying the 
theoretical underpinnings and practical solutions to the problem would both be very much 
appreciated in this field. 
This chapter describes the general service scheduling model studied in this thesis.  The 
properties of a general Distributed Service Scheduling Problem (DSSP) are described, and 
the DSSP is then modeled as a game. A Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction that solves 
the game is constructed, and the computational challenges of applying this VCG auction 
to the DSSP are discussed.  
3.1 Properties of a DSSP 
The first property of a DSSP is that it is a distributed scheduling environment. In the 
context of this thesis, the distributed environment is specified using a description from 
Ghenniwa (1996): a distributed environment is constructed from entities that are able to 
perform some functions independently and exercise some degree of authority in sharing 
such capabilities. Such entities are put to work in the same spatial-time domain to achieve 
either a common goal or separate goals. As mentioned earlier, to recognize the independent 
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and autonomous nature of the entities, they are treated as agents. In a distributed 
environment, there are situations where knowledge about a scheduling problem, e.g. 
customers’ availability and preference information, is distributed among agents and the 
overall problem knowledge does not reside in a single agent.  
[Definition 3.1 Distributed Scheduling Environment] A distributed scheduling 
environment is an environment where the knowledge of a problem is distributed among 
agents and no single agent has a global view of the problem (distribution of knowledge).   
The second property of a DSSP is that it is a dynamic environment. Customers’ 
involvement in service production may cause knowledge about scheduling problem may 
change over time. Uncertainty in customer demand, uncertainty in service time duration, 
customer cancelation and no-shows, and changes in customer preferences are some 
examples of dynamic changes in a service scheduling environment. 
[Definition 3.2 Dynamic Scheduling Environment] A dynamic scheduling environment 
is an environment where the knowledge of the scheduling problem may change over time. 
The third property of a DSSP is the presence of customer’s private information. As 
mentioned earlier, in order for a service to be produced, a customer has to be present 
personally or he/she must present his/her property or information. Service scheduling 
should therefore be generated by considering that a customer’s inputs are available for the 
service process. Customers’ preferences regarding the timing of delivering their inputs 
would then be considered in service scheduling. However, a customers’ availability may 
very well be their private information and they could behave strategically to protect that 
private information. In addition to a customers’ availability, which is (almost always) their 
private information, the price that a customer is willing to pay to a service provider for a 
given service time slot is also their private information. Customers are motivated to not 
reveal the highest price they are willing to pay to the service provider, and in most cases, 
these prices are considered to be very sensitive private information that they are reluctant 
to reveal. 
[Definition 3.3 Customer’s private information] In a DSSP, customers may not want to 
reveal some information (e.g. the value that customers give to different scheduling 
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alternatives, a customer’s full availability). They may act strategically to protect their 
private information.  
The fourth property of a DSSP is that there are complicated, perhaps conflicting 
objectives. The distributed service scheduling environment enables each agent to have their 
own scheduling objectives. The objectives of these agents can vary from one to another. In 
addition to multiple objectives, since agents are self-interested, they are likely to behave 
strategically to achieve their own objectives without considering the global objectives of 
the system.  
[Definition 3.4 Complicated objectives] The objective in a service scheduling problem is 
a combination of multiple objectives, each from an individual agent. These may be in 
conflict with each other, and each agent may behave strategically to advance their own 
objective. This characteristic derives from the self-interested nature of agents in this 
environment. 
3.2 Centralized Formulation 
In a DSSP, customers have private information: their actual valuations of different 
scheduling alternatives, such as completion times, are part of their private information, 
which is not known to the provider. However, to clearly demonstrate the combinatorial 
optimization nature of the problem, one can first assume a centralized environment, i.e., 
where customers’ valuations are known to the provider. With this assumption, the problem 
can be conveniently modeled as a mixed integer program. The decentralized characteristic 
of the problem will be considered during the development of the game’s theoretic 
modeling. 
Consider a set of customers and a service provider. The service provider can provide a 
set of different services, with a limited capacity for each time slot. A customer has a request 
which can be a combination of different services. The customers compete with each other 
to schedule their own requests according to their respective objectives. Each customer’s 
value of a schedule (i.e., the price that she is willing to pay for the request to be completed 
at a specific time) is their private information. Each customer is motivated by their own 
objectives and is not controlled by other customers or by a system-wide authority. The 
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service scheduling problem involves the allocation of service time slots to the customer’s 
requests, such that a provider’s capacity constraints are satisfied and the sum of customers’ 
values is maximized. 
Formally, the DSSP problem consists of a set of 𝑛 customers and a service provider 
that can provide a set of 𝑚 services. Within the scheduling horizon, each service 𝑖(𝑖 =
1, … 𝑚) has a sequence of service time slots 𝑙𝑖,𝑘(𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑖) available for processing 





For each service time slot 𝑙𝑖,𝑘 ∈ 𝐿, its capacity is limited by 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑖, 𝑘), which means 
that no more than 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑖, 𝑘) number of customers can be served within 𝑙𝑖,𝑘. Each 
customer 𝑗(𝑗 = 1, … 𝑛) has a request, which is a combination of different services provided 
by the provider. A customer may need a bundle of time slots to process their request.   
For a bundle 𝐵 ⊆ 𝐿 that contains an allocation of the provider’s service time slots to a 
customer’s request, that customer will have a valuation on 𝐵. Let 𝑣𝑗(𝐵) be the value 
customer 𝑗 attaches to the time slot bundle 𝐵. This thesis follows the private value model 
introduced by Vickrey (1961). Therefore, a customer has a value for each 𝐵 ⊆ 𝐿, and these 
values do not depend on the private information of the other customers. Each customer 
knows his or her own values, but not the values of others. 
Let 𝑥𝑗(𝐵) = 1 if 𝐵is allocated to customer 𝑗 , and be equal to zero otherwise. The DSSP 
problem involves the selection of a set of time slot bundles for customers such that the 
service provider’s capacity constraints are respected and, at the same time, the sum of 
customer value (social welfare, in terms of microeconomics) derived from the selected 
bundles is maximized. The problem can be formulated as the following integer 
programming. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑗(𝐵)𝑣𝑗(𝐵)𝐵∈𝐿
𝑛
𝑗=1           
Subject to 
∑ 𝑥𝑗(𝐵) ≤ 1,      𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑛𝐵∈𝐿       (1)   
∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑗(𝐵) ≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑖, 𝑘),
𝑛
𝑗=1𝐵∋𝑙𝑖,𝑘  𝑖 = 1 … 𝑚;  𝑘 = 1 … 𝑚𝑖   (2) 




Constraints (1) ensure that a customer can only obtain one bundle of time slots. 
Constraints (2) ensure that the allocation of a time slot to customers does not exceed the 
capacity limit of the service time slot. Constraints (3) are a set of integer constraints. The 
centralized formulation of the DSSP problem is NP-hard, as stated in the following 
theorem.  
Theorem 1: The centralized formulation of the DSSP problem is NP-hard.  
Proof: To show that the centralized formulation of DSSP is NP-hard, consider a special 
case in which 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑖, 𝑘) = 1, for all 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑚;  𝑘 = 1 … 𝑚𝑖. In this case, the special 
case is a set packing problem, which is NP-complete (Karp, 1972). It follows that, as a 
general case, the centralized formulation of DSSP problem is NP-hard∎. 
3.3 Game theoretic modelling and VCG auction construction  
Centralized formulation in the previous section was created by assuming that 
customers’ valuations are known to the service provider. This assumption should be 
removed in the game theory modeling. Since customer’s valuations are their private 
information they may behave strategically to maximize their own benefits.  
The solution to this challenge is to design mechanisms that will induce agents to behave 
so that a certain outcome prevails. In other words, to provide incentives to the agents in the 
system such that they behave in a way that is prescribed by the system.  
As the computational complexities inherited from the combinatorial nature of the 
scheduling problem are not related to the game theoretical modeling, the scheduling details 
can be ignored to focus only on strategic interactions. The DSSP is first modeled as a game, 
and then a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction that solves the game with an 
economically efficient outcome is constructed. 
Let 𝑁 be the set of 𝑛 customer agents. Each agent has a service request from a service 
provider. Service requests need to be scheduled on the service provider’s resources. Let Ω 
be the set of all feasible schedules. Each feasible schedule determines the allocations of the 
time slots of service resources to the customers’ request. For each schedule 𝑆𝜖Ω, each agent 
𝑗 has a monetary value 𝑉𝑗(𝑆). A value is the maximum price that an agent is willing to pay 
to process its service request as scheduled in 𝑆. 𝑃𝑗(𝑆) is the price the agent 𝑗, needs to pay 
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to the service provider in exchange for processing its request. It is payoff on schedule 𝑆 is 
 𝑣𝑗(𝑆)−𝑝𝑗(𝑆) . Agents’ objective is to maximize their payoffs and service provider 
objective is to maximize market efficiency. The goal here is to design a mechanism that 
select a schedule which maximize the sum of agent’s valuations. A VCG auction is 
constructed here for the service scheduling problem.  
Let 𝑉∗ be the maximum of the total values of all agents that can be obtained by a 
schedule in Ω and  Ṽ be the maximum of the total values of agents when 𝑗 is excluded from 
the schedule.  




 Ṽ = 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑆∈Ω ∑ 𝑉𝑗(𝑆)
𝑗∈𝑁\𝑗
 
When the auction starts, agents submit their values for all feasible schedules Ω. If an 
agent’s request was not included in a schedule, the agent’s valuation on the schedule will 
be zero.  After receiving agents’ value, the service provider (auctioneer) chooses the final 
schedule 𝑆∗ from Ω in a way that it solves 𝑉∗. Service provider also generate a schedule for 
each agent, in a way that the schedule solves Ṽ . After the schedules are computed, the 
amount that agent 𝑗 pays for final schedule 𝑆∗ is  𝑝𝑗(𝑆
∗) =  Ṽ − [V∗ − Vj(𝑆
∗)] and agent 
j’s payoff from participating in the auction is  
𝑉𝑗(𝑆
∗) −  𝑝𝑗(𝑆
∗) =  𝑉𝑗(𝑆
∗) − ( Ṽ − [V∗ − 𝑉𝑗(𝑆
∗)]) = V∗ −  Ṽ . It is clear that V∗ ≥  Ṽ, which 
means agents always get non negative payoff when they participate in the auction. In 
addition to motivate agents to participate, the designed auction is also incentive-
compatible. A mechanism is incentive-compatible if it is every agent’s dominant strategy 
to reveal their private values truthfully.  
Theorem 2: Given the auction constructed for the game theoretic model of DSSP, for all 
customers, submitting truth valuations to the auctioneer is a dominant strategy. 
Proof: Suppose agent j reports wj as its value instead of vj, wj ≠ vj. Service provider then 
chooses  S̃ ∈ Ω as a final schedule by solving 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑆∈Ω[∑ vi(S)i≠j + wj(S)]. 
Agent j’s payoff then becomes 
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Vj(S̃) − Pj(S̃) = Vj(S̃) − [ Ṽ −  ∑ vi(S̃)]i≠j  = ∑ vi(S̃)i≠j  + Vj(S̃) −  Ṽ ≤ V
∗ −  Ṽ. 
From the above formula it is obvious that agents will not get benefit by misreporting their 
valuations. 
By using centralized formulation of service scheduling problem the set of all feasible 
schedules Ω can be obtained and by using constructed VCG auction the optimal schedule 
in Ω  can be found. It appears that everything needed to solve the DSSP have been found. 
However in reality there are several implementation limitations in applying VCG auction 
to DSSP. The limitations can be described from three different perspectives; service 
provider (auctioneer), customer agents, and system requirements. 
From the customer agents’ side, there is a valuation complexity. For each agent 
valuation complexity refers to the effort needs to determine its values over an exponential 
number of schedules in Ω.  
Form service provider’ side, there is a high computational complexity. In the VCG 
auction, service provider needs to find the solution of V∗ and Ṽ for all the agents, which 
means n+1 NP-hard optimization problems. It is obvious that if the VCG auction applied 
to non-trivial sized problems the computation cost can be prohibitively expensive. More 
importantly, service provider needs each customer’s complete valuation on the alternative 
schedules. In service scheduling environment, customers are reluctant to reveal their 
complete valuations. They fear that their information could leak out and adversely affect 
the service provider decisions. 
From system requirement’s side, there is a high communication complexity. VCG 
auction requires a large number of schedules communicated between service provider and 
agents. In addition, VCG auction does not support the dynamic changes (e.g. changes in 
the number of customers and their valuations on different schedules) that occur during an 
auction. Once an auction starts, customers should be ready to submit their complete 
valuations on alternative schedules. In many service scheduling environments it is not 
practical to ask all customers to be prepared to start the auction at a predefined time. The 
VCG auction does not have the potential to accommodate a customer arriving during an 
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auction. In the following chapter, we propose an iterative bidding framework aimed at 
addressing the limitations arising in the application of the VCG auction to a DSSP. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter defines the properties of the general DSSP and it provides the centralized 
formulation of a general service scheduling problem. In a DSSP, the knowledge of a 
scheduling problem is distributed among agents, and the strategies of agents cannot be 
controlled by outside parties, such as other agents in the environment. In this situation, 
agents can be assumed to perform strategically in service of their own objectives. The 
solution to this challenge is to design mechanisms to induce agents to behave such that a 
certain outcome prevails. For this purpose, I first modeled the service scheduling problem 
as a game and then constructed a VCG auction as a mechanism design that solves the game 
with an economically efficient outcome. However, the VCG auction’s limitations, in terms 
of implementation, restrict its application to DSSPs. The next chapter shows how the 
computational and communication complexity issues derived from applying VCG auctions 





Chapter 4 Iterative Bidding Framework for 
Distributed Service Scheduling  
This chapter presents a solution framework for DSSP. Chapter 3 showed how applying 
VCG auction directly to DSSP requires every agent to reveal its valuation of all of the 
feasible schedules, and the auctioneer need to solve a sequence of NP-hard optimization 
problem to determine the outcome, which is computationally expensive requirement. In 
addition, VCG is a one-shot auction that does not accommodate dynamic changes during 
the bidding processes. The Iterative Bidding Scheduling Framework (IbSCHF) proposed 
in this chapter addresses the inherent limitations that arise when applying VCG to DSSP. 
IbSCHF is an iterative combinatorial auction-based approach to the DSSP. Iterative 
combinatorial auctions are indirect implementations of VCG auction and it addresses the 
computational and informational complexity of VCG. In this class of auction agents are 
not required to submit (and compute) complete and exact information about their private 
values. Agents are allowed to reveal their preference information as it becomes necessary, 
as the auction proceeds. Typical examples of iterative combinatorial auction include Parkes 
and Ungar, 2000, Parkes and Kalagnanam, (2005), Bikhchandani and Ostroy, (2006). 
Parkes and Ungar (2000) proposed iBundle, an iterative combinatorial auction for the 
combinatorial allocation problem. iBundle computes the efficient resource allocation when 
agents follow a myopic best-response bidding strategy, bidding for the items that maximize 
their surplus taking the current price as being fixed. Their approach solves the 
combinatorial allocation problem without requiring complete information revelation from 
agents. A comprehensive survey for combinatorial auctions can be found in Vries and 
Vohra (2003). 
The above-mentioned combinatorial auctions are not designed for scheduling problem 
they are designed for general combinatorial allocation problem. However they can be 
applied to scheduling problem by exploring the specific problem characteristics derived 
from the scheduling domain.  
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In the literature there are few combinatorial auctions that designed specifically for 
scheduling problems. Combinatorial auction for job shop scheduling problem is applied by 
Kutanoglu and Wu, (1999) with the focus on investigating the links between combinatorial 
auctions and Lagrangean relaxation. The properties of several auction protocols are 
investigated in the context of decentralized scheduling by Wellman et al., (2001). 
An iterative combinatorial auction-based framework for a particular type of scheduling 
problem, DSSP, is presented in this chapter. In addition to addressing the computational 
complexities of applying VCG auction to DSSP, the framework has the potential of 
accommodating dynamic changes in the scheduling environment. The chapter is organized 
as follows. Section 4.1 describes the IbSCHF. Section 4.2 validates the effectiveness of 
this framework through a computational study. Section 4.3 explains how the proposed 
framework can be applied to accommodate dynamic changes, and section 4.4 summarizes 
the chapter. 
4.1 The IbSCHF 
A key challenge in the development of solutions to DSSP is the design of a mechanism 
that allocates limited service capacities to customers, such that the overall value of 
customers is maximized despite the self-interest of individual agents. Auctions have long 
been considered an effective way of allocating limited resources to competing users and to 
discover market prices for products and services. In recent years, the pervasive inter-
connectivity provided by the Internet has made auctions a popular mechanism that directly 
links the capacities of service providers with end customers. In this chapter, we present an 
auction-based framework for DSSP. The auction is implemented using an iterative bidding 
protocol, which can be seen as a collaborative negotiation procedure between the provider 
and customers. This iterative bidding protocol is described below. 
4.1.1 Iterative Bidding Protocol 
The iterative bidding protocol is a price mechanism in which a service provider 
balances the request requirements among customers by adjusting the prices of time slot 
bundles. The protocol adopts the non-anonymous bundle price structure, under which a 
customer’s bid is represented as a tuple 〈𝑏𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒, 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒〉, where 𝑏𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑙𝑒 is the 
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set of time slots that the customer wants, and the 𝑏𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is the price that the 
customer is willing to pay for the services to be delivered during those specified time slots. 
The bidding price is customer-dependent. There is no common public price for a bundle. 
A non-anonymous price structure allows providers to price the same bundle differently for 
different customers, which is a common practice in many service industries. The bidding 
procedure consists of four components: initialization, price update and bidding, termination 
checking, and winner determination.   
4.1.2 Initialization 
Before the bidding starts, the service provider first presents the set of available services 
and available time slots for each service to the customers. For each service time 
slot 𝑙𝑖,𝑘(𝑘 = 1, … , 𝑚𝑖), the provider sets up a base cost. Customers then compute their 
respective sets of feasible bundles. For each feasible bundle, a customer computes the value 
attached to it based on the utility derived from that bundle. The initial bidding price of a 
bundle is the cost of the bundle, which is calculated by adding up the base costs of the 
service time slots included in the bundle. Knowing the values and initial bidding prices of 
bundles, a customer computes the payoff of each bundle. I assume a private value model 
(Vickrey, 1961) for all customers. Under this model, each customer has a value for their 
bundles. A customer’s payoff for a bundle is the difference between their value for a bundle 
and its bidding price. To maintain a positive payoff, the customer is willing to pay up to 
their value to get the bundle.  After obtaining the payoffs for their feasible bundles, the 
customer selects the bundle with the highest payoff (breaking ties randomly) as their first 
bundle to bid on. 
4.1.3 Price Updating and Bidding 
At the beginning of round 𝑡 (𝑡 > 1), customer agents must update their bidding prices 
for the bundles they submitted in round 𝑡 − 1. Customer agents update their bidding prices 
based on the provisional allocation that resulted from the winner determination at 
round 𝑡 − 1. Customer agents have three price updating option at round 𝑡 if their bid was 
not awarded in the provisional allocation at round 𝑡 − 1: (1) they can increase their bidding 
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prices by ε  on the bundle they bid for at round 𝑡 − 1 or rounds before 𝑡 − 1. Here ε is the 
minimum price increment imposed by the service provider. In general customer agents do 
not increase their bids more than ε, because they are rational in maximizing their utilities. 
However, they are allowed to increase their bid with higher value than ε ; (2) they can take 
an ε discount and keep the bidding prices unchanged. If a customer agent takes this ε 
discount, the service provider will consider that the customer has entered into final bid 
status. A customer agent with final bid status is forbidden from increasing the bidding 
prices on any of their bundles in future rounds; and (3) they can, of course, withdraw from 
the bidding process.  
A customer agent can keep its bidding price unchanged at round 𝑡, if it is included in 
the provisional allocation at round 𝑡 − 1.  
After updating their bidding prices, a customer agent needs to compute their set of 
utility-maximizing bundles. In computing such a set, customer agent 𝑗 solves a 
maximization problem 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐵∈𝐸𝑗[𝑣𝑗(𝐵) − 𝑝𝑗
𝑡(𝐵)] and obtains the set of bundles that 
equally maximizes their utility, where 𝑝𝑗
𝑡(𝐵) is the bidding price for 𝐵 at round 𝑡. That is, 




𝑡(𝐵′). After obtaining the set of utility-maximizing bundles, the customer randomly picks 
one and submits it to the provider with the updated bidding price.  
If a customer agent has entered into final bid status, it is not allowed to increase its 
bidding price anymore. However the service provider can allow customer agents to repeat 
their final bid in future rounds until termination. Final bid repeating can enhance efficiency 
and increase service provider’s revenue. The reason is that, in each bidding iteration it is 
possible that provisional allocation changes due to newly received bids with higher values. 
Such changes in provisional allocations may allow the space for allocation of previously 
submitted bids that have been temporarily excluded. In the absence of final bid repeating, 
a customer agent will not acquire its required resources even if the future bids make the 
capacities available for acceptance of its final bid.  
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4.1.4 Bid Screening and Termination 
After XOR-Bids have been received from the customer agents, the service provider 
first screens out invalid bids; a bid is considered as invalid when: (1) it includes increased 
price form a customer agent who has already declared his final bidding status in previous 
rounds; or (2) it includes bidding price for a bundle that is below the highest bidding price 
for that bundle received in previous rounds. Invalid bids will not be considered in the 
following winner determination procedure.  
On this stage, the service provider determines if the termination condition is satisfied 
based on the valid bids in this round. Termination condition examines if all the customers 
have repeated their bids in the last round, i.e. the price of none of the valid bids are updates 
from the last round. If termination condition is not satisfied, the winner determination 
model should be solved with the valid bids as input. Otherwise, the customers will be 
informed about the final allocation and they will be charged based on their bidding prices.  
4.1.5 Winner Determination 
The service provider needs to compute a new provisional allocation in each round as 
long as the bidding is not terminated. The winner determination model selects a subset of 
the bids submitted by the customers such that the overall bidding price of the provisional 
allocation is maximized and the capacity constraints of the provider are not violated. Let 
𝑁𝑡 be the set of customers that submitted their bids at round 𝑡 , and 𝑝𝑗
𝑡(𝐵𝑗
𝑡) be the bidding 
price of customer 𝑗 at round 𝑡, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑡, where 𝐵𝑗
𝑡 is the bundle submitted by customer 𝑗 at 
round 𝑡. Let 𝑍𝑗 = 1 if customer 𝑗 wins and 𝑍𝑗 = 0 otherwise. The winner determination 
model can be expressed using the following integer programming. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝑍𝑗𝑝𝑗
𝑡(𝐵𝑗





≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑖, 𝑘), 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑚;  𝑘 = 1 … 𝑚𝑖   (1) 
𝑍𝑗 = {0,1},    𝑗 ∈ 𝑁
𝑡                   (2) 
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Constraints (1) ensure that the bids awarded in a provisional allocation do not violate 
the provider’s capacity constraints. Constraint (2) is a set of integer constraints. 
The winner determination problem is a general form of the set packing problem, which 
is NP-hard. The commercial optimization package ILOG CPLEX 12.0 is used to solve the 
winner determination problem. Although winner determination problems in combinatorial 
auctions are generally NP-hard, many of them can be solved quickly by modern 
optimization algorithms, up to fairly large sizes. Anderson et al. (2000) report that CPLEX 
6.5 performs very well in terms of running time for many of the common winner 
determination problem benchmark distributions. The solving speed is comparable to the 
special-purpose winner determination algorithms, such as those in Fujishima et al. (1999) 
and Sandholm (2002). Sandholm et al. (2005) show that some winner determination 
distributions, with thousands of bids, can be solved by CPLEX 8.0 within a couple of 
seconds.  
4.1.6 Implementation considerations 
The efficiency of auctions largely depends on the level of competition among 
customers. The Internet provides pervasive accessibility to virtually any electronic market; 
customers may come at quite varied times. To aggregate demand and facilitate competition, 
Internet auctions usually span a couple of days or even longer. Customers can enter the 
auction and place bids at any time before the auction ends. To spare customers the task of 
continuously monitoring the bidding process and repeatedly placing their bids, Internet 
auctions allow bidders to provide direct value information to an automated bidding agent, 
called a proxy agent, which bids on behalf of the customer. 
In the IbSCHF for DSSP, a proxy agent can be designed to manage a set of feasible 
bundles for the customer, and decides which bundle to submit, at which round, and at what 
price. The customer should therefore inform the agent regarding the value it places on each 
of the feasible bundles. Meanwhile, the agent should be equipped with the algorithm used 
to update bidding prices and select the payoff maximization bundle along the bidding 
process. If the customer prefers, the agent can also inform the customer regarding the 
bidding status and allow the customer to update the values before the auction ends. For 
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easy access, customers may install the proxy agent on a personal computer, a smart phone, 
or other mobile devices. 
Many online auctions provide a “buy it now” option to accommodate those buyers who 
cannot wait until the auction ends. A buyer can purchase an item immediately by paying 
the buy-it-now price. However, the buy-it-now price is usually a regular retail price which 
can be much higher than the final auction price. For the purpose of this model, buy-it-now 
should not be considered as part of the auction design.  
4.2 Simulation results 
This section evaluates the IbSCHF through computational analysis. The assessing 
metrics are those commonly found in the literature.  
4.2.1 Metrics 
Efficiency and Information Revelation are used as the performance measures in the 
evaluation. Parkes (2001) developed these metrics for testing the performance of iBundle, 
an iterative combinatorial auction for general combinatorial allocation problems. These 
metrics are redefined in the context of service scheduling as follows: 
Efficiency of Scheduling: 𝑒𝑓𝑓(𝑆), is measured as the ratio of sum of the values in final 
schedule 𝑆 to the sum of the values in optimal schedule 𝑆∗ that maximizes total value across 
the agents: 




where 𝑉𝑗(𝑆) is agent 𝑗’s valuation on a schedule 𝑆, 𝑉𝑗(𝑆
∗) is agent 𝑗’s valuation on the 
optimal schedule 𝑆∗, and 𝑁 is the set of all agents.  
Information Revelation: 𝑖𝑛𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑣(𝑗), is measured for agent 𝑗 as the sum of the final price 
bid for all bundles that agent 𝑗 has placed bids on, as a fraction of the sum of the values for 
all feasible bundles. 









∗(𝐵) is the maximum bidding price of agent 𝑗 for bundle 𝐵 during the auction; 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑗  is the set of bundles that agent 𝑗 has placed bids on; and 𝐸𝑗 is the set of feasible 
bundles for agent 𝑗. The average information revelation over all agents is considered as 
overall information revelation (𝑖𝑛𝑓). 
Bidding process often terminates before agents have revealed the complete information 
about their values for service time slot bundles. The information revelation metric measures 
the extent to which an agent has revealed its value for each service time slot bundle to the 
provider during the auction. 
The DSSP model is coded in ILOG Optimization Programming Languages 
(http://www-01.ibm.com/software/websphere/products/optimization/) and the ten groups 
of problem instances are solved using ILOG CPLEX. The flow control of the iterative 
bidding process is coded in the OPL (Optimization Programming Languages) script 
language. A desktop PC with 2.4G Intel CPU and 8 GB memory was used to run the 
experiments.  
4.2.2 Problem Sets 
Ten problem groups are generated, with the customer number ranging from100 to 
1,000. For each group, ten instances are randomly generated. Service time slots’ capacity 
are allocated in proportion to the number of customers such that, for most of the instances, 
around 80–90 % of the customers will be awarded a feasible bundle. The configuration of 
the test problem sets are summarized in Table 4-1.  
In the design of the testing data, it is assumed that there is a regular retail price for 
each of the available service time slots, and the retail price for a bundle is the sum of the 
retail prices of the service time slots included in the bundle. The reservation price for a 
bundle is set to be 40% of its retail price, since it is common practice in online service 
auctions that the termination price can be as low as a 60% discount from the regular retail 
price. It is assumed that customers who enter the auction expect some discount. They are 
not interested in purchasing the bundle at a price higher than the regular retail price. 
Customers’ values on a bundle are randomly drawn from a uniform probability distribution 
between reservation price and its regular retail price. 
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Table 4-1 Configuration of testing problems 
Problem Number 
of agents 
# of service 
time slots 
# of feasible 




1 Group 1 100 20 Random(5,10) 10 
2 Group 2 200 30 Random(5,10) 10 
3 Group 3 300 40 Random(5,10) 10 
4 Group 4 400 50 Random(5,15) 10 
5 Group 5 500 60 Random(5,15) 10 
6 Group 6 600 70 Random(5,15) 10 
7 Group 7 700 80 Random(5,15) 10 
8 Group 8 800 90 Random(5,20) 10 
9 Group 9 900 100 Random(5,20) 10 
10 Group 10 1000 110 Random(5,20) 10 
 
4.2.3 Computational Results 
The IbSCHF is compared against the commonly used first-come-first-served capacity 
allocation policy. This approach is easy to implement and performs reasonably well in 
terms of enhancing revenue when capacity supply and demand are balanced. However, 
when demand exhibits strong seasonality, an auction-based policy performs better. To 
compare the performance of an auction-based policy against that of a first-come first-
served capacity allocation policy, each policy is applied to the ten groups of testing 
problems. In the first-come first-served policy scenario, customers in an instance are first 
randomly ordered. Capacity is allocated according to their position in the sequence until 
no more customers can be satisfied. Figure 4-1 shows the efficiency of the first-come-first-
served policy and of the proposed approach over the ten test problems. It is observed that 
the first-come-first-served policy achieves on average 75 % of the efficiency obtained by 




Figure 4-1 Efficiency of the FIFO and of the IbSCHF over ten groups 
 
The IbSCHF is also compared against the VCG auction. In the VCG auction, all agents 
report their complete valuations over all service time slot bundles at the beginning of the 
auction. Figure 4-2 plots the information revelation performance of the IbSCHF. Compared 
to the VCG, which requires 100% information revelation, IbSCHF requires a less than 50% 
information revelation with bid increment ɛ =5, which comes with the cost of losing only 
1%-2% of the efficiency, as shown in Figure 4-3. 
The comparison results presented in Figure 4-2 and Figure 4-3 reflect the difference 
between the iterative bidding structure (in IbSCHF) and the one-shot bidding structure (in 
the VCG auction) in the context of distributed service scheduling.  
 
Figure 4-2 Information revelation of the VCG and of the IbSCHF as the problem difficulty is 
G 1 G 2 G 3 G 4 G 5 G 6 G 7 G 8 G 9 G10
IbSCHF 99.55 99.05 99.85 99.75 99.7 99.65 98.85 99 99.085 99.745



















G 1 G 2 G 3 G 4 G 5 G 6 G 7 G 8 G 9 G10
IbSCHF 45.6 35.9 46.5 45.3 41.8 43.7 40.4 48.1 41.04 45.53




























Figure 4-3 Efficiency performance of the VCG and of the IbSCHF as the problem difficulty is 
increased 
4.2.4 The effect of bid increments 
Figure 4-4 plots the information revelation performance of the IbSCHF over different 
bid increments. Bigger bid increment leads to more information revelation. The reason is 
that bigger bid increment values may overcome some low price equilibrium point that 
smaller increments could find.   
 
Figure 4-4 Information revelation performance of the IbSCHF over 10 groups with different bid 
increments  
G 1 G 2 G 3 G 4 G 5 G 6 G 7 G 8 G 9 G10
IbSCHF 99.5 98.8 99.9 99.7 99.6 99.5 98.7 99.8 98.67 99.79






















G 1 G 2 G 3 G 4 G 5 G 6 G 7 G 8 G 9 G10
ɛ = 5 45.6 35.9 46.5 45.3 41.8 43.7 40.4 48.1 41.04 45.53
ɛ = 10 49.7 37.9 49.36 43.04 43.5 47.3 42.1 50.2 42.2 46.04


































Figure 4-6 Number of Iterations of the IbSCHF over10 groups with different bid increments  
 
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10
ε = 5 65.177 279.7315 302.1815 307.9175 359.751 374.915 398.869 415.413 449.9275 587.1065
ε =10 98.0535 158.5755 204.167 208.826 263.061 280.0885 299.661 354.16 413.059 490.591


















G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10
ε = 5 582 908 963.5 1102.5 1104.5 1160.5 1413 1426.5 1513.5 1580
ε =10 515 634.5 883.5 889 930.5 991 1054.5 1086.5 1321 1469





























Figure 4-5 plots the run time of the IbSCHF for different bid increments. The results 
show that bigger increment values requires less time for the auction to terminate. This 
makes sense, because bigger increments lead to a lower number of iterations (Figure 4-6), 
and many agents quickly drop out as the prices get too high. Figure 4-5 also illustrates that 
when the number of agents increases the level of completion increases, and it takes more 
time to compute the solution. 
4.2.5 The effect of final bid repeating 
The reason for considering final bid repeating rule in IbSCHF is to boost efficiency and 
service provider’s revenue. As shown in Figure 4-7 efficiency will be increased by 
considering final bid repeating rule. However considering final bid repeating rule will 
increases the level of completion, and consequently increases the run time (Figure 4-8). 
 
Figure 4-7 The effect of final bid repeating on efficiency 
 
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10
 With FinalBid-Rep 99.55 98.8 99.9 99.7 99.6 99.5 98.7 99.8 98.67 99.79




















Figure 4-8 The effect of final bid repeating on run time 
The next section explains how IbSCHF can be applied to accommodate dynamic 
changes in the service scheduling environment. 
4.3 Accommodating Dynamic Changes 
Generated schedules in a dynamic service environment cannot be used for a long time 
because of unexpected events. Therefore revising the schedules at some point in time is 
necessary to accommodate dynamic changes. Two main question will arise for revising the 
schedules: when to revise and how to respond? 
4.3.1 When to revise? 
There are several ways to decide on timing for revising the scheduling decisions. The 
first approach is called periodic rescheduling policy in which generated schedules are 
revised periodically. In this approach revisions are made at the beginning of each time 
interval by taking into account new information gathered from the scheduling environment. 
Determining the period length depends on the application domain. Muhlemann et al. 
(1982), Ovacik and Uzsoy (1994), and Sabuncuoglu and Karabuk (1999) investigated the 
effects of different rescheduling frequency in manufacturing environments. The second 
approach is called event driven policy in which revisions are made in response to an 
unexpected event that change the system states. Church and Uzsoy (1992) provide a 
comparison of periodic and event driven policies for dynamic shops. A comparison 
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10
 With FinalBid-Rep 65.177 279.73 302.18 307.92 359.75 374.92 398.87 415.41 449.93 587.11



















between the performance of periodic policy and the performance of event driven policy in 
a single machine environment is also presented by Vieira et al. (2000). Hybrid policy is 
another method in which rescheduling is triggered when an unexpected event occurs and 
at the end of each time interval (Yamamoto and Nof 1985). 
4.3.2 How to respond? 
In general there are two main strategies: 1) completely regenerate a new up-to-date 
schedule for all remaining jobs and 2) repair the existing schedule to take into account of 
the current state of the system. The first strategy may in principle be capable of maintaining 
optimal solutions, however computation times are likely to be prohibitive and production 
may be significantly delayed while the schedule is regenerated. Furthermore, completely 
regenerate a schedule is not applicable in a service environment because generating new 
schedules for customers is not possible without their permission. In the second strategy 
several techniques such as heuristics, knowledge-based systems, fuzzy logic, neural 
networks, and hybrid techniques can be used to repair a schedule. Ouelhadj et al. 2009 
provide a review of the state of the art of research on dynamic scheduling techniques and 
compare their relative merits. 
In a service environment, the repair strategy is the most appropriate approach; when 
dynamic changes happen, generating a completely new schedule may find customers 
unsatisfied with their new schedules. A repair strategy that tends to minimize the 
perturbation to the original schedule would be more appropriate to apply in service 
scheduling environments.  
A periodic repair approach by using IbSCHF for dealing with dynamic changes in 
service environments with the objectives of automation and optimization is described in 
the next section. 
4.3.3  Periodic repair approach in service scheduling environment  
The automated repair scheduling approach for accommodating dynamic changes is 
proposed here, along with how to effectively allocate the newly-available service time slots 
created by customer cancellations. To fill newly available service time slots some service 
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providers keep an on-call list of customers who could be available and interested to fill 
those newly time slots. However, calling the customers on the on-call list incur high 
administrative costs to the service provider and is a multiple-round rescheduling process 
because, once a customer is allocating to a newly-available time slot, its original time slot 
(if he/she had already been assigned one) becomes available and will have to be reallocated.  
This process of reallocating time slots can go multiple rounds until all the available 
time slots have been filled or there is not any customer willing to be rescheduled. Manually 
conducting multiple round of rescheduling process will significantly increase the 
administrative workload. In addition, constructing a high quality schedule is an 
optimization problem that requires computing-based decision making tools, so manually-
created schedules is not an appropriate approach for generating high quality schedule.  
Thus, to improve the current practice of dynamic service scheduling, two challenges 
need to be addressed. The first one is automate the process of rescheduling to reduce the 
administrative workload and enhance the efficiency of the process; the second one is 
optimization, to systematically optimize the quality of the rescheduling solutions. To 
address both these challenges, the approach proposed here is periodic repair scheduling in 
response to dynamic changes. 
The periodic repair scheduling algorithm can be described as follows: 
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝 0 ∶ 𝑆𝑒𝑡 𝑖 = 1; 
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝 1 ∶ 
           𝐴𝑇𝑆 = 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 (𝑖 − 1)𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑇; 
           𝑆𝐶𝐴 = 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑏𝑦 𝐶𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑇𝑆 
     𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑒 ( 𝐴𝑇𝑆 ≠  ∅  &  𝑆𝐶𝐴 ≠  ∅ )  
               {    𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡 ← I𝑏SCHF  (𝐴𝑇𝑆, 𝑆𝐶𝐴); 
                        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑗 ∈ 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑢𝑙𝑡  
{                    𝑆𝐶𝐴 ← 𝑆𝐶𝐴 − 𝑗 ; 
                                            𝐴𝑇𝑆 ← 𝐴𝑇𝑆 − {𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑗} ; 
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                   𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑗 𝑤𝑎𝑠 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 
                 (𝑖 − 1)𝑇 & 𝑖𝑇  𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
           { 
                                  𝐴𝑇𝑆 ← 𝐴𝑇𝑆 ∪ { 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑙𝑦 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑗} 
        } 
     }                } 
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑝 2:   𝑆𝑒𝑡 𝑖 = 𝑖 + 1; 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑔𝑜 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝 1; 
 
In step 0, the service provider agent identifies the set of newly-available time slots 
along the scheduling time horizon between (𝑖 − 1)𝑇  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑇. It then determines which 
customer agent has registered as a standby status for available time slots between (𝑖 −
1)𝑇 & 𝑖𝑇. Next, the service provider agent starts the I𝑏SCHF by sending out a message 
containing the set of available service time slots to the customer agents with the standby 
status. Those standby customer agents who are interested in that set of available time slots 
participate in the auction. When  I𝑏SCHF terminates and new time slot allocations are 
determined, the service provider agent will update the existing schedule and notify the 
participating customer agents with the results. The customer agents that gained their 
requested time slots will update their status levels from standby to reserved.  
Since each customer agent can only have one time bundle, if a customer agent changes 
its status from standby to reserved and is assigned to new bundle, the time slots it 
previously held become available. If this newly-available time slot is between  
(𝑖 − 1)𝑇 & 𝑖𝑇 it will be added to the  𝐴𝑇𝑆 . Therefore, additional round of I𝑏SCHF need to 
be conducted until either no customer agents are interested in the available time slots or no 




4.3.4  A Worked example  
An example of a service scheduling solution using the periodic repair scheduling 
approach is shown in Figure 4-9, which represents the allocation of ten time slots 
(𝑇1 𝑡𝑜 𝑇10). In this example, 𝑇 are taken for the following two work days. For the sake of 
simplicity, in this illustrative example it is assumed that, only one time slot is allocated to 
each customer. However, in the I𝑏SCHF, the winner determination model does not have 
this restriction.  
 
Figure 4-9 Example of a problem solved using the periodic repair scheduling approach 
The service repair scheduling problem parameters which include the list of customers 
willing to be rescheduled, their preferred service time(s) and their value, are shown in Table 
4-2. 
At the beginning of time window T, 𝐴𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇5.  𝑇3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇5 become available as 
two customers cancel their allocated service time slots. The repair scheduling process starts 








Table 4-2 Problem parameters of example 






























The service provider agent starts the I𝑏SCHF at the beginning of time period T. From 
Table 4-2 we can see that customers 𝐶6  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶12  are interested in available time slot 𝑇3,  and 
customer agents 𝐶8  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶11 are interested in available time slot 𝑇5. Their customer agents 
will participate in the auction. After the I𝑏SCHF termination, time slot  𝑇3 has been awarded 
to 𝐶6  and time slot   𝑇5 has been awarded to 𝐶8 , because they have higher values for time 
slots  𝑇3 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇5 . Consequently, now that 𝐶6  and  𝐶8 have been rescheduled, the time slots 
𝑇6 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇8 which originally belonged to those customers are now available. Another auction 
by using I𝑏SCHF will be started to allocate these newly-available time slots to interested 
customers. In this example, customer agent  𝐶10  participates in the second auction for time 
slot  𝑇6 and agents 𝐶11  and  𝐶12 for 𝑇8. The result of this second auction is that time slot  𝑇6 
has been awarded to 𝐶10  and time slot  𝑇8 has been awarded to 𝐶11 . In this case, since   𝐶11 
was outside of time window T, the only available time slot for the next auction will be  𝑇10, 
which belonged to customer 𝐶10  in the previous round. The third auction begins, this one 
for time slot  𝑇10 and with the participation of customer agent 𝐶12. The third auction 
instantly awards 𝑇10 to customer 𝐶12, the only customer that participated. At this point, all 
the openings in the time window T have been allocated and no further auctions are required.  
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4.3.5 Efficiency Analysis  
The proposed periodic repair scheduling system provides the potential for successful 
automated service scheduling. It is reasonable to assume that a substantial number of 
customers would be willing to participate in this program. In order for such a system to be 
functional, the customer agent will register itself with standby status for certain unavailable 
service time slots in the service provider internet portal and then automatically participate 
in the rescheduling process when any of those time slots become available.  
To evaluate the responsiveness of the system, we have randomly generated nine groups 
of problem instances of different sizes and structures. The configuration of the test problem 
sets and the corresponding solving times by means of CPLEX are summarized in Table 4-
3. The flow control of the repair scheduling is coded in OPL (Optimization Programming 
Languages) script language. A desktop PC with a 2.4G Intel CPU and 8 GB of memory 
was used to run the experiments. 
 
Table 4-3 Configuration of testing problems and computational results 
Group # of Customer 
agents 
Window length 
(# of time slots) 
# of Available 
time slots (𝐴𝑇𝑆) 
Running time 
(seconds) 
# of Auctions 
1 100 8 2 7.4062 1 
2 200 16 3 24.008 2 
3 300 24 4 39.648 2 
4 400 32 5 54.254 2 
5 500 40 6 92.898 3 
6 600 48 7 112.878 3 
7 700 56 8 126.806 3 
8 800 64 9 141.596 3 
9 900 72 10 194.584 4 
10 1000 80 11 237.154 4 
In these problem instances, the maximum number of time slots required for all service 
requests has been limited to two. For each group, CPLEX can find optimal solutions to 
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instances with 1000 customer agents within less than 4 minutes, which is satisfactory for 
the responsiveness requirement of our repair scheduling system.  
4.4 Summary 
This chapter presents the I𝑏SCHF for the distributed service scheduling problem. The 
approach is incentive-compatible in the sense that customers will follow the myopic best-
response bidding strategy prescribed by the auction protocol. The simulation results 
indicate that the proposed framework requires lower information revelation with the cost 
of losing only 1%-2% of efficiency, compared to the one-shot VCG auction. By applying 
the I𝑏SCHF in a multi-agent environment the three main service scheduling challenges of 
service scheduling problem namely, distributed environment, the presence of customers’ 
private information and complicated objectives can be overcome. This framework can also 





Chapter 5 Scheduling Non-Commercial 
Services 
5.1 Introduction 
An iterative bidding framework for DSSP was proposed and detailed in chapter 4. In 
this proposed framework, a price mechanism is used to allocate service time slots to 
customers. However, in non-commercial service scheduling environments, such  as  
scientific  facility  service scheduling,  government  service scheduling  and  healthcare  
service scheduling,  for  social economic  and  political  reasons  service  providers  cannot  
use a price mechanism to schedule  customers along the service timelines. Therefore, novel 
mechanism design models need to be developed for scheduling non-commercial services 
without using a price system or payment transfers. 
In this chapter, I study the scheduling aspect of non-commercial services. I am 
especially interested in learning how  to  design  effective  mechanisms  for  non-
commercial service  scheduling,  and  how  customers’ private information  and  efficiency 
interplay under such mechanisms. I have designed an auction-based (with iterative bidding) 
scheduling framework under two constraints (1) service providers are restrained from using 
any price mechanisms to allocate service time slots to customers and (2) customers are 
reluctant to share their complete availability information. The next section introduces the 
non-commercial services scheduling problem and customers’ private information 
implication. 
5.2 Non-commercial services scheduling and customers’ private information 
The  Non-Commercial  Service  Scheduling  (NCSS)  problem  concerns  the  allocation  
of  limited resources to the service  activities at specific times. This allocation must obey a 
set of rules or constraints that reflect the temporal relationships between activities and the 
capacity limitations of a set of shared service resources.  
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5.2.1 The implication of customers’ private information on efficiency 
NCSS can be modelled as an optimization problem in which customers’ private 
availability information constrains the solution space. 
According to the definition of service presented in chapter 1, a service relies 
significantly on customer inputs (Sampson & Froehle, 2006). In other words, in order for 
a service to be produced, a customer has to present personally or he/she has to present 
his/her belongings or information. By considering customers’ available time for their 
required service, the number of no-shows can be decreased and customer satisfaction 
increased. For example, in health care services, it has been shown that matching patients 
with their preferred provider and offering them a convenient appointment time can 
decrease the number of no-shows and thereby increase operational efficiency (Barron 
1980). If all customers report their full availability, the service provider can obtain an 
optimal schedule by solving the optimization problem.  However, if customers only reveal 
partial availability to the service provider, the quality of the solution will be compromised.  
High-quality schedules could be deemed infeasible due to the partial availability of 
customer information. The scheduling problem facing service providers is a distributed 
scheduling problem in the sense that the customers’ true availability is their private 
information and may not be fully known to the service provider. Customers are reluctant 
to reveal their complete availability because a complete revelation increases the possibility 
of being assigned an undesirable time slot. Generating high quality schedules and, at the 
same time, accommodating customers’ preferences is a challenge. In addition to dealing 
with strategic behaviours from customers, the administrative workload of collecting 
customers’ availability information and  negotiating  with  them  for  possible  changes  can  
be  very  difficult due  to  a large  number  of customers and a manually managed process.  
The proposed approach makes it possible to automate the NCSS procedure and improve 
the quality of schedules. In the next section, I formulate the service provider’s and 
customers’ decision problems in NCSS. 
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5.3 Formulation of service provider’s and customers’ decision problems  
Service scheduling is a multilateral decision making problem with the service provider 
and customers as independent decision makers. The service provider needs to decide how 
to schedule service requests  to  achieve  its  objectives  and,  at  the  same  time,  respect  
the  customer’s  availability constraints. The decision facing a customer is how much 
availability information she needs to reveal in order to maximize her benefit.  
5.3.1 Service provider’s decision problem  
Consider  an  NCSS  problem  consisting  of  a  service  provider  and  a  group  of  
customers.  The provider receives a set of   service requests from customers. Each request 
is assigned a weight which reflects its contribution to the provider’s objective. The provider 
has a limited service capacity and knows the time required for processing each request. The 
provider’s objective is to maximize the sum of the weights of a schedule. An important 
type of constraints of NCSS is customers’ availability. Since customers need to be present 
for the service, the provider cannot schedule a customer for a time slot when she is not 
available. I describe a customer’s availability by a set of available time intervals along the 
scheduling timeline. As I will later develop an iterative bidding framework for NCSS 
problems, I represent an available time interval as a bid  from  a  customer  using  the  
bundle  bidding  language  (Nisan ,2006)  developed  for  combinatorial auctions.  To apply 
the language, I need to first discretize the provider’s service timeline into fixed-size time 
slots.  In this way, without loss of generality, an available time interval can be defined by 
a bundle of adjacent time slots contained in the interval. Unlike general combinatorial 
auctions, customers do not attach prices to their bids in NCSS. In our case, bids are used 
by the customers to indicate their availabilities. If a customer submits a bid (their available 
time interval), she informs the provider that she is available to be scheduled during that 
interval.  
The  set  of  intervals  that  contains  a  customer’s  complete  availability  is  referred  
to  as  the customer’s set of Feasible Time Intervals (FTIs).   
Let  𝐸𝑗  be the set of availability intervals revealed by customer. It is clear that  𝐸𝑗 is a 
subset of customer𝑗’s FTIs. The service provider will not schedule customer 𝑗 ’s request 
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outside her 𝐸𝑗. Let 𝑤𝑗 be the weight scale of customer  𝑗  assigned by the service provider 
and 𝑝𝑗 the processing time of customer 𝑗’s request. Let 𝛺 be the set of time slot available 
for allocation and  𝐽  the set of customers  who  have  service  requests  to  be  scheduled;  
let 𝑥𝑗(𝐵) = 1  if  the  time  slot  bundle 𝐵 ⊆ 𝛺  is  allocated  to  customer  j   and  zero  
otherwise.  The provider’s decision problem is to determine  the  allocation  of  limited  
service  time  to  the  requests  in  a  way  that  the  sum  of  the weights of the awarded 
requests is maximized. The problem can be formulated as the following integer 
programming.  






∑ 𝑥𝑗(𝐵) ≤ 1,      ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐵⊆𝛺        (1) 
∑ ∑ 𝑥𝑗(𝐵) ≤ 1,     ∀𝑖
𝑛
𝑗=1𝐵∋𝑖 ∈ 𝛺       (2) 
∑ 𝑥𝑗(𝐵) = ∑ 𝑥𝑗(𝐵),   𝐵⊆𝐸𝑗 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, ∀𝐵 ∈ 𝛺𝐵⊆𝛺      (3) 
|𝐵| + 𝐻𝑥𝑗 (𝐵) ≤ 𝑝𝑗 + 𝐻,         ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, ∀𝐵 ∈ 𝛺            (4) 
|𝐵| + 𝐻 ≥ 𝑝𝑗 + 𝐻𝑥𝑗 (𝐵),         ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, ∀𝐵 ∈ 𝛺            (5)  
𝑥𝑗(𝐵) = {0,1},   ∀𝐵 ⊆ 𝛺,   ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐽      (6)                                 
 
The set of constraints (1) ensures that any customer can only obtain one bundle of time 
slots. The set of constraints (2) ensures that a time slot is not included in two bundles that 
have been assigned to customers. The set of constraints (3) ensures that if a bundle is 
assigned to a customer,  it  must  belong  to  the  set  of  available  intervals  submitted  by  
that  customer.  These constraints prevent a service provider from assigning customers’ 
time bundles which they are not willing to accept. Constraints (4) and (5) ensure that if a 
bundle is assigned to a customer, the length of  the  bundle  is  equal  to  the  processing  
time  of  the  customer’s  request,  where  H is  a  large positive constant that is used for 
the linearization of the logical constraint “if.” The minimum value of 𝐻   depends on the 
problem instance. In general, a value of  𝐻 that is greater than the number of available time 
slots of the service provider is large enough to enforce the logical “if” constraint. 
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Constraints (6) are integer constraints. The provider’s decision problem is NP-hard, as 
stated in the following theorem. 
      
Theorem 1 The service provider’s decision problem in NCSS is NP-hard.  
 
Proof:  Consider  a  special  case  of  the  provider’s  decision  problem,  in  which  a  set  
of service requests  from  customers needs  to  be  scheduled.  A request may be scheduled 
on one of the 𝑙 intervals on a discrete time scale on a single resource.  The decision version 
of this special case of provider’s decision problem is identical to the job interval selection 
problem, which is NP-complete (Keil, 1992). Therefore, the decision version of provider’s 
decision problem is NP-complete. It follows that the provider’s decision problem is NP-
hard. 
5.3.2 Customers’ decision problem  
To model the customers’ decision problem, I first introduce their preference structure 
over the time intervals in their FTIs. A customer’s FTI list is her private information, and 
is not known to the service provider.  She  may  behave  strategically,  for  example, may  
hide  a portion  of  her  FTIs,  to  maximize  her benefits. To reflect this self-interested 
property of customers, I call them agents. I assume that an agent prefers some time intervals 
over others within its FTIs and that the preferences can be quantified by associating a 
preference violation cost to each time interval. The preference violation cost reflects the 
level of the preference violations to an agent.  It is essentially a subjective measure adopted 
by an agent. For example, it can be a function of the number and severity of preference 
violations that a time interval may cause to the agent. In many cases, it is reasonable to 
assume that an agent can order the time intervals in its FTIs according to the increasing 
order of their preference violation costs. That is, given an ordered FTI, 
c1 < c2 < c3 < ⋯ ck … < c|FTI| < c0  is known to the agent, where ck  denotes the 
preference violation cost of the  kth time interval  in  an FTI  and  c0  denotes  the  preference  
violation  cost  of  not  being  allocated  any  time intervals. Note that an agent may have 
identical preference violation costs for more than one time interval. In an FTI, the  highest  
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preference  violation  cost  is  that  of  not  being  awarded  anything in  the  service  
schedule.  
An  agent  would  prefer  to  be  assigned  a  time  interval  with  their lowest  preference  
violation  cost. However, the final schedule is computed based on the time intervals 
submitted from all agents. Because of the potential time conflicts among agents’ requests, 
it is difficult for them to decide how much availability information should be revealed in 
order to obtain a preferred assignment. If an  agent  only  submits  a  few  low -cost  time  
intervals,  it  can  control  the  upper  bound  of  its preference  violation  cost  as  the  
awarded  bundle  must  be  within  the  set  of  submitted  intervals. However,  by  doing  
so,  it  runs  the  risk  of  not  being  allocated  anything  if  the  submitted  time intervals 
are also demanded by other agents with higher weights.  On the other hand, if an agent 
submits  its  complete  FTI list,  it  maximizes  its  probability  of  getting  an  assignment.  
However, reporting  complete  FTIs  increases  the  possibility  of  ending  up  with  an  
interval  with  high preference  violation  cost.  In  fact,  there  is  not  a  clear  strategy  for  
agents  to  minimize  their expected preference violation costs.  The effectiveness of an 
agent’s bidding strategy depends on how heavy the competition is for its desired time 
intervals and on other agents’ bidding strategies. This  uncertainty  leads  to  speculation  
during  bidding,  which  will  increase  agents’  computation cost and may render a final 
schedule that is arbitrary and far from optimal. The goal, therefore, is to design a 
mechanism  which  systematically  evolves  the  solution  towards  an  optimal  one  given  
the constraint  that  agents  try  to  avoid  high  cost  assignments  by  not  revealing  their  
complete availability.  Since  no  payment  is  allowed  in  the  NCSS  setting,  the  
possibility  of  applying standard one-shot VCG mechanisms (Clarke, 1971 ; Groves, 1973; 
Vickrey,1961) and even its iterative implementations (Parkes,2006) is eliminated. In the 
following section, I propose a non-price bidding approach to the NCSS problem and 
evaluate its performance. 
5.4 The iterative bidding framework 
The iterative bidding framework proposed here is an auction-based approach to the 
NCSS problem. The framework contains two major components: an iterative bidding 
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procedure and an integer programming model for winner determination. The winner 
determination model computes provisional schedules which maximize the sum of the 
weights of the winning bids at each round. The iterative bidding procedure provides a 
structure through which the agents and the service provider (auctioneer) can interact in a 
systematic way and eventually evolve provisional solutions towards an optimal one. 
Iterative bidding also reduces the level of agents’ information revelation and adds the 
potential of accommodating dynamic changes during the bidding process.  The iterative 
bidding framework is a single-attribute auction that allows negotiation over a non-price 
attribute: the level of availability of agents revealed to the auctioneer. The framework 
requires agents to reveal their availability only on a necessary basis.  
5.4.1 Iterative bidding 
The iterative bidding procedure is depicted as a flow chart in Figure 5-1.  There are 
mainly four components of the bidding procedure: initialization, availability update and 
bidding, termination checking and winner determination. 
5.4.1.1 Initialization 
Initially, an agent has a service request and provides a set of time slots during which 
the request can be processed. The agent constructs its initial bid by selecting the time slot 
with the lowest preference violation cost and sends it to the auctioneer.  
5.4.1.2 Availability Update and Bidding  
Agents update their availability by sending new feasible time slots to the auctioneer. 
At the beginning of round 𝑡 (𝑡 > 1), an agent needs to decide whether it submits additional 
time slots to the auctioneer at round 𝑡.  This decision is made based on the provisional 
schedule which resulted from the winner determination at round 𝑡 − 1. If an agent was not 
awarded in the provisional schedule at round 𝑡 − 1, it has two availability update options 
at round 𝑡: (1) it can submit additional time slots, or, (2) it can keep the set of submitted 
time slots unchanged by submitting an empty bid (a bid without time slots). However, if an 
agent submits an empty bid, the auctioneer will consider that the agent has entered into 
final bid status and so will be forbidden from updating its availability in future rounds.  
Given these options, I will show in the next section that, since agents are assumed to be 
rational in minimizing their preference violation costs, they will always follow the myopic 
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bidding strategy. Figure 5-2 depicts the agent’s myopic bidding strategy in the format of a 
flow chart.  After receiving the winner determination results from round 𝑡 − 1, the agent 
will submit an empty bid at round 𝑡 if it won at round 𝑡 − 1. However, if the agent lost, it 
will check whether all its FTIs have been submitted. If yes, the agent will still submit an 
empty bid because there are no more available time slots to be added; if no, the agent will 
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Figure 5-2 Agents’ myopic bidding strategy at a specific round 
 
5.4.2 Bid screening and termination checking 
Once bids are received from the agents, the auctioneer first screens out all the invalid 
bids. Those bids will not be considered in the subsequent winner determination procedure. 
Invalid bids are defined as having (1) any time slots that were submitted in previous rounds; 
or (2) new time slots from agents who have already declared their final bidding status in a 
previous round. 
The auctioneer then checks the termination condition against the valid bids. The auction 
terminates if there are no new availability updates for all the valid bids in this round. That 
is, each agent that bid in the last round has either submitted an empty bid or withdrawn 
from the bidding process. After the auction terminates, the auctioneer implements the final 
schedule.  If the termination condition is not satisfied, the auctioneer will update its agents’ 
available time slot pool by adding the newly submitted time slots to those already submitted 
in previous rounds and solve the winner determination model using the updated availability 
information as input.  
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5.4.3 Winner determination 
The auctioneer needs to compute a new provisional schedule in each round until the 
auction has terminated. At round 𝑡, the new provisional schedule 𝑆𝑡 solves the provider’s 
decision problem model with updated availability from all bidding agents at round 𝑡 as 
input.  It is possible that multiple schedules could have the same optimal overall weight.  
Which optimal schedule the auctioneer will find first is determined by a combination of 
multiple factors, such as the design and configuration of the winner determination 
algorithm and the organization pattern of the input data. After winner determination, the 
auctioneer will inform all the bidding agents with the results as to whether they win or lose 
in round 𝑡. After receiving the results, the agents will decide their strategy on availability 
updating and start a new round of bidding. It is important to note that the winner 
determination model here is different from that of many other combinatorial auctions, in 
which the losing bids will not be considered in future rounds (Vries & Vohra, 2003). In our 
model, the bid from an agent is just a new addition to its already submitted availability. 
When computing the provisional schedule, the winner determination algorithm will 
consider all the time slots submitted from an agent during the current and previous rounds. 
In addition, the provisional schedule is determined by the updated availability at the current 
round. It is not affected by the bidding sequence(s) in previous rounds.  
5.5 Properties of the iterative bidding framework 
In the design of the iterative bidding framework, agents bid according to the myopic 
bidding strategy described in Figure 5-2. As I have assumed that agents are self-interested, 
a question arises naturally: will the agents really follow the myopic strategy? I now study 
the iterative bidding framework from the incentive compatibility perspective. I prove that 
the myopic bidding strategy I have designed is the dominant strategy for agents, as stated 
in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 Given the proposed iterative bidding mechanism, myopic bidding is the 
dominant strategy for agents.  
Proof: It is clear that if an agent has already been awarded in the previous round, there 
is no reason for it to add new time slots in the current round because more availability will 
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increase the upper bound of its preference violation cost. Therefore, it will follow the 
myopic strategy by reporting an empty bid. Next, consider the situation where an agent is 
not awarded in the previous round. Assume that the agent has reported its first 𝑘 − 1 time 
slots in its FTI during the previous rounds. If the agent follows the myopic strategy, it 
should add the 𝑘th time slot at the current round and update its availability to the first 𝑘 
time slots. To compare with the myopic strategy, I present here an alternative strategy for 
the agent, in which it reports first (𝑘 + 1) time slots. In the following I will prove that the 
myopic strategy weakly dominates the alternative strategy. Consider three cases: 
Case#1: The agent is not awarded in the current round, no matter it submits its first 𝑘 or 
 𝑘 + 1 time slots. In this case, both its first 𝑘 and first 𝑘 + 1 time slots end up with the 
same preference violation cost, which is 𝑐0. There is no difference between the myopic 
and the alternative strategies. 
Case#2: The agent is awarded by submitting its first 𝑘 time slots. In this case, the agent 
must be awarded by reporting its first 𝑘 + 1 time slots because its first 𝑘 is a subset of 
first 𝑘 + 1. Since the awarded time slot can fall into any one of the submitted time slots, 
I compare the expected preference violation cost of the myopic strategy and that of the 
alternative strategy. Let 𝑎𝑘 denotes the number of time slots, which costs 𝑐𝑘 , that the 
agent can possibly be allocated to. Since 𝑐1 ≤ 𝑐2 ≤ 𝑐3 ≤ ⋯ ≤ 𝑐𝑘 ≤ 𝑐𝑘+1, 
then 𝑐𝑘+1 ∑ 𝑎𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ≥ ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑐𝑖
𝑘
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𝑖=1⁄  .  
Since adding the time slot 𝑘 + 1 will increase the feasible schedule space of the winner 
determination, the value of 𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑘 will not be changed. The left-hand side of the 
last inequality can be interpreted as the expected cost of reporting the first 𝑘 + 1 time 
slots and the right-hand side can be interpreted as the expected cost of reporting only the 
first 𝑘 time slots. It is clear that since the agent can be awarded by just reporting its first 
𝑘 time slots, the myopic strategy will always lead to the lowest expected preference 
violation cost.  
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Case#3: The agent is not awarded by reporting its first 𝑘 time slots, but is awarded by 
reporting its first 𝑘 + 1 time slots. In this case, although by the myopic strategy, the agent 
is not awarded at the current round, it always has the option of reporting its first 𝑘 + 1 
by repeatedly applying the myopic strategy in the next round. Given that the bidding 
sequence does not affect the winner-determination result, that is, the same set of time slot 
availability will result in the same provisional schedule, the agent will not lose any 
opportunity by adopting the myopic strategy. 
It follows that the myopic strategy weakly dominates the alternative strategy with the first 
𝑘 + 1 time slots. This conclusion also applies to initial round of bidding. Since the 
provisional schedule before the initial round is empty, which can be interpreted as no agent 
is allocated a bundle. Therefore the best strategy for agents’ initial round bidding is myopic 
strategy. That is, at the first round, an agent should bid with its lowest cost time intervals 
in its FTIs. By mathematical induction, it follows that, myopic bidding is the dominant 
strategy for agent given the proposed iterative bidding mechanism. ∎  
5.6 Iterative bidding with partial allocation during each round 
The iterative bidding procedure I have proposed computes provisional allocation 
during each round. It does not permanently award time slots to customers until the 
termination condition has been reached. The procedure may reach higher quality solutions 
since it collects more agents’ availability along the process of bidding.  However, as the 
bidding proceeds, the size of the winner determination problem will increase continuously. 
Since I have shown that the winner determination problem is NP-hard, it follows that for a 
service scheduling problem with a large number of customers, winner determination will 
be slowed down considerably as more availability information is added. As a variant of the 
proposed iterative bidding procedure, it is possible to award the provisional allocation to 
customers during each round. In the subsequent round, those awarded time slots will be 
removed from the service provider’s service time inventory, the awarded customers will 
withdraw from the bidding process, and the customers who were not awarded in the current 
round will construct their bids based on the updated inventory. The service provider will 
solve the winner determination problem formulated by the updated inventory and the bids 
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submitted in the current round.  This process allows the size of the winner determination 
problem to decrease along the iterations, as both the size of the provider’s inventory and 
the number of bidding agents decrease. The bidding terminates in fewer rounds than the 
original procedure.  
5.7 Simulation results: information revelation and efficiency analysis 
By designing an iterative bidding framework, agents only need to reveal their 
availability information when it is necessary. In addition, the higher system transparency 
makes adoption of the framework easier. However, these benefits are gained at the cost of 
efficiency. If at the termination of bidding all the agents have revealed their full availability, 
the winner determination algorithm will compute an optimal schedule which maximizes 
the sum of the weights of awarded agents. However, when bidding terminates before all 
feasibility information has become known to the diagnostic service agent, the optimality 
of the solution is not guaranteed. In this section, I evaluate the information 
revelation/efficiency performance of the proposed approach through a computational 
study.  
Given a solution schedule, the measure of its efficiency is defined as the ratio between 
its overall weight and that of an optimal solution for the same problem instance. The 
measure of information revelation is the ratio of the revealed availability of all agents when 
the solution is reached and to their complete availability. Intuitively, submitting more 
availability incurs higher information revelation, which increases the expected preference 
violation cost. 
I used ILOG CPLEX 12.1 as optimization engine for solving the winner determination 
model, with the set of bids from agents as the input. The iterative bidding control logic is 
coded using the OPL Script language (Van and Michel, 2000). The control module and the 
optimization engine were integrated using the ILOG OPL environment (http://www. 01. 
ibm.com/software/integration/optimization/cplex-optimization-studio).All experiments 




Figure 5-3 Efficiency increment during iterative bidding 
 
 
Figure 5-4 information revelation increment during iterative bidding 




















































Figure 5-5 Trade-off between efficiency and information revelation 
                     
I generated a set of test problem instances by fixing the service provider’s time slot 
inventory at 20 and the number of customers at 50. Customers’ weights were drawn from 
a uniform distribution ranging from 1 to 3. The processing times for agents’ requests are 
identical and restricted to one time slot. For each agent, I randomly selected a set of time 
intervals from the service provider’s available time inventory to form its FTI. The sizes of 
the agents’ FTIs were drawn from a uniform distribution in the range of 8 to 16 with a 
mean of 12.The length of the time intervals in FTIs is restricted to one. The time intervals 
in the FTIs were randomly ordered.  
I solved the set of problem instances using the proposed iterative bidding framework 
and computed the average efficiency and information revelation at each round of bidding. 
The bidding processes without partial allocation usually terminated within 12 rounds, 
which is the mean of the size of the FTIs. The bidding processes with partial allocation 
usually terminated within 6 rounds, which is, as expected, much faster than the bidding 
without partial allocation.  
Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show the efficiency and information revelation increment during 
the bidding process. At round 6, the modified bidding procedure with partial allocation 

















































































partial allocation achieves on average 93% efficiency at round 12. The bidding procedure 
with partial allocation is essentially a ‘greedy’ distributed search algorithm which can find 
a solution quickly. However, its solution quality can be compromised. The bidding 
procedure without partial allocation involves backtracking. However, it normally reaches 
a higher quality solution with additional bidding rounds. From Figure 5-4, it is clear that 
the information revelation of bidding with partial allocation is always lower than that of 
bidding without partial allocation, and that this difference increases along the bidding 
process. Compared to bidding without partial allocation, it appears that bidding with partial 
allocation can achieve a reasonably good solution with much less computation costs and 
information revelation. Figure 5-5 shows the trade-off between efficiency and information 
revelation; as expected, high efficiency demands more information revelation. The results 
confirm that increasing information revelation has a diminishing return in efficiency.  
Bidding with partial allocation can reach 84% efficiency with only 34% information 
revelation, whereas bidding without partial allocation needs to double the information 
revelation (70%) in order to reach the same efficiency level. For bidding without partial 
allocation, a solution with 93% efficiency demands information revelation of 79%. Since 
it is the agents that decide when to stop submitting more availability information to the 
auctioneer, the bidding procedure actually provides them with the option of setting their 
respective information revelation limits based on their own calculation of the costs caused 
by information revelation. In this experiment, I did not consider the situation where agents 
have information revelation limits. However, Figure 5-5 gives an indication of the 
efficiency that can be reached given various levels of information revelation.  
5.8 Summary 
In recent years, the economy has evolved from manufacturing to services. Service 
supply chain management has become an important research area with significant practical 
implications. Scheduling non-commercial services for self-interested customers who 
behave strategically to protect their private information is a challenging problem to resolve 
in accordance with the different objectives of service provider and customers. In non-
commercial service scheduling environments, no payment transfers are allowed, which 
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eliminates the possibility of designing price- or payment-based mechanisms to balance the 
supply and demand. I have proposed a bidding framework for scheduling non-commercial 
services and evaluate its efficiency and information revelation performance through 
theoretical analysis and computational experiments. I show that, under the proposed 
auction mechanism, myopic bidding is the dominant strategy for customers. In terms of the 
efficiency and information revelation performance, the computational study shows that 
bidding with partial allocation can find a reasonably good solution with much less 
computation costs and information revelation. For both cases of bidding, with and without 











Chapter 6  Applications 
This chapter presents the application of the IbSCHF to two problem domains: service 
mass customization under capacity constraints and appointment scheduling in a health care 
system. The objective is to demonstrate the applicability of IbSCHF to both commercial 
and non-commercial service scheduling domains, rather than providing complete solutions 
to these problems. 
6.1 Applying framework 
The IbSCHF can be applied to various service scheduling domains in which customers 
compete to schedule their service activities to make their best use of resources. To apply 
the framework in a problem domain, the first step is identifying customers and modeling 
them as agents. To carry out this step, an agent’s job, their constraints, and their valuations 
over different schedules need to be specified. The second step is the configuration of the 
bidding process, which includes modeling the winner determination problem, specifying 
the bid structure and the bid update rules. 
The rest of this chapter demonstrates how the two-step procedure is used to configure 
the IbSCHF to solve two different problems. 
6.2 Service mass customization under capacity constraints 
Mass customization aims at producing what customers need with near mass production 
efficiency. It can be seen as a collaborative optimization process between a company and 
its customers, with the goal of finding the best match between the company’s capabilities 
and their customers’ needs. A company’s core capabilities are the basis of its product 
families and their successive platforms (Meyer and Utterback1993). These capabilities are 
reflected in the people and assets applied to the development of new products. A company’s 
capabilities can be represented by its product family architecture (PFA) (Tseng and Jiao 
1996; Jiao and Tseng 1999) which consists of a common base, a differentiation enabler, 
and a configuration mechanism. While a PFA can serve as a systematic protocol that 
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customers can use to navigate through a company’s capabilities and define their own 
requirements, capabilities can also be organized and presented using scalable product 
family design (Simpson et al. 2001) and configurational product family design (Du et al. 
2001; Ulrich1995). In scalable product family design, a variety of customer needs are 
satisfied through the configuration of scaling variables which are used to “stretch” or 
“shrink” the product platform in one or more dimensions. Configurational product family 
design, on the other hand, aims at developing a modular product platform on which product 
family members are derived by adding, substituting, and/or removing one or more 
functional modules. The search for a better match between a company’s capabilities and 
their customer’s needs has been the central theme in mass customization literature for more 
than a decade (Jiao et al.2007; Simpson 2004; Da Silveira et al. 2001). In this chapter, a 
different perspective is taken to examine the impact of a company’s capacity on product 
customizability and customer value. Here the term capacity is defined as a company’s 
ability to produce customized products for a group of customers within a predefined time 
schedule. 
It is imperative to consider a company’s capacity constraints in customization decision 
making when production schedules are important to customers. This is particularly true in 
service customization. Unlike product manufacturing, service production usually involves 
customer’s labour in the process (i.e., co-production), or it requires the physical presence 
of the customer. Common examples can be seen in health care offices, buffet restaurants, 
and travel services. For service customers, it is desirable to have convenient production 
schedules because they need to be physically present during service production. In 
addition, the service provider’s capacity is perishable, as service operations cannot rely on 
inventories to adjust to demand fluctuations. Perishability alludes to the time-sensitive 
nature of a service provider’s capacity to produce a service (Sampson 2001). In service 
customization, capacity constraints directly affect customers’ satisfaction, as well as 
provider’s profitability. Therefore, capacity constraints should be integrated into service 
customization decision making. 
To motivate the research from a practical perspective, consider the case of the mass 
customization of travel packages. Major online travel brands such as Expedia Inc. 
 86 
 
(Expedia.com), Opodo (Opodo.com), and Orbitz Worldwide (Orbitz.com) are giving their 
customers the tools to customize their own adventures in the form of “build your own 
package”. Compared to pre-packaged vacations, customized packages are more attractive 
to customers because everyone’s travel experience is unique and personal. A customized 
vacation package usually includes one or more of the following components: flight 
reservation, hotel reservation, car rental, and tickets to entertainment events. For a specific 
destination and a specific time window, the capacity limits of these components restrict 
customers’ options and affect the customizability of travel products. This is particularly the 
case during high seasons, when the capacities of service providers are stretched to their 
limits. Similar situations occur in manufacturing mass customization. For example, in 
configurational product family design, a customer customizes its individual product by 
adding a group of functional modules to a base product. If a particular module takes 
excessively longer time to be delivered due to the manufacture’s capacity constraints, the 
customer may switch to an alternative module or even cancel the order. 
This chapter addresses the capacity aspect of mass customization. Specifically, it 
answers the question: Given limited capacity, how can a company maximize the value 
provided to its customers by coordinating customers’ customization requirements? The 
main objective of the proposed approach is to maximize value across a large group of 
customers, which is, in economics terms, to maximize the social welfare (Mas-Colell et al. 
1995). To facilitate clear formulation of the problem and meaningful presentation of the 
solution, the scope of the chapter is restricted to service customization settings. However, 
the proposed model could be applied to manufacturing customization. In this chapter, 
Service Customization under Capacity Constraints (SCCC) is modeled as an optimization 
problem. The contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, customers’ customization 
decision making is integrated with a company’s capacity constraints, which is of particular 
relevance in service customization settings where a provider’s capacity is perishable and 
often expensive to expand. Second, at the system level, the overall value provided to 
customers is maximized by coordinating customers’ customization requirements through 
auction-based multilateral negotiations. It is assumed that a company’s objective is to 
maximize overall customer value. This objective is desirable because, in the long run, a 
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company can improve its profit only by providing customers with high value-added 
products and services.  
6.2.1 Centralized problem formulation 
This section provides a centralized formulation of the SCCC problem, which consists 
of a group of customers and a service provider. The customers want to customize the 
service products. To provide a common design domain, the provider is assumed to adopt a 
configurational product family design approach (Du et al. 2001; Ulrich 1995) such that it 
can present its capabilities in the form of a set of building blocks (services). Customers can 
customize the product by choosing a base product (a pre-defined group of services) and 
adding optional services according to their preferences. A customized product is a package 
of services chosen by a customer. For example, a vacation package can include 
transportation services, accommodation services, and additional entertainment activities. 
For a provider, a service has a capacity limit which is defined as the number of customers 
the service can accommodate during a specified time window. The customer attaches a 
value to each package of services. 
Formally, the SCCC problem consists of a set of n customers and a set of m services. 
A customer can configure its service package by selecting a group of services. A service 
package has to include a pre-configured set of services, that is, the base configuration, 
denoted 𝑆̅. For service 𝑖, its capacity is limited by capacity (𝑖). Let 𝐸𝑗 be the set of service 
packages which are acceptable by customer 𝑗 (i.e., feasible packages) and 𝐸 be the union 
of the sets of acceptable service packages from all customers, so that  𝐸 = ⋃ 𝐸𝑗𝑗=1…𝑛  Let 
𝑣𝑗(𝐵) be the value of customer j attached to the service package ∈ 𝐸 .𝑣𝑗(𝐵) > 0 if 𝐵 ∈ 𝐸𝑗; 
𝑣𝑗(𝐵) = 0 otherwise. Let 𝑥𝑗(𝐵) = 1 
if the bundle 𝐵 ∈ 𝐸 is allocated to customer j and zero 
otherwise.The SCCC problem involves the selection of a set of service packages for 
customers such that the service provider’s capacity constraints are respected and, at the 
same time, the sum of the customer value (social welfare, in terms of microeconomics) 
derived from the selected packages is maximized. The problem can be formulated as the 
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Constraints (1) ensure that a customer can only obtain one service package. Constraints 
(2) ensure that the allocation of a service to customers does not exceed the capacity limit 
of the service provider. The set of constraints (3) ensure that if a package is assigned to a 
customer, it must belong to the set of product configurations that are acceptable to that 
customer. These constraints prevent the provider from assigning customers packages 
which they are not willing to accept. Constraints (4) enforce the selection of the base 
configuration in each awarded package. Constraints (5) are a set of integer constraints. 
Theorem 1: The problem of service customization under capacity constraints (SCCC) is 
NP-hard.  
Proof: To show that SCCC is NP-hard, consider a special case in which 𝐸𝑗 = 𝐸 for all 
𝑗 = 1, … 𝑛 and 𝑆̅  = 𝜙. In this case, constraints (3) and constraints (4) always hold. The 
relaxed model is a set-packing problem, which is NP-complete (Karp, 1972). It follows 
that, as a general case, SCCC problem is NP-hard∎.  
The SCCC is an integer programming model which takes customer value as input. The 
key question to be asked here is how the values that each customer assigns to the packages 
can be obtained. Computing value from product configurations can be customer-specific. 
One approach, suggested by Tseng and Du (1998), is to use methods designed to measure 
consumer preferences in marketing research, such as conjoint analysis (IntelliQuest 1990). 
Conjoint analysis assumes that a product could be described as vectors of attributes, and 
each attribute can include several discrete levels. 
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To apply conjoint analysis to the SSCC, each service is modelled as an attribute and 
the discrete levels of attributes are restricted to 1 (service included) and 0 (service not 
included). As the SCCC requires customers’ complete valuation on all feasible packages, 
computing a value for each and every configuration may become impractical when the 
range of feasible packages becomes large. Although customers can determine the value of 
feasible packages, they may be reluctant to report the value back to the service provider 
because, by the definition of the private value model, value is the highest price that a 
customer is willing to pay for a given package. In many cases, these prices are sensitive 
private information. The proposed iterative bidding framework in chapter 4 computes high 
quality solutions to SCCC problem without requiring valuations from customers. The 
proposed auction is a price mechanism in which a provider coordinates the customization 
requirements among its customers by adjusting the prices of service packages. 
6.2.2 Service mass customization under capacity constraints using IbSCHF 
Bidding 
Each agent has a valuation function expressing its values on different service packages. 
An agent’s valuation can be expressed as an XOR-bid. For example <  𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 >
 expresses the agent’s willingness to pay the price for the services included in the Package. 
We also assume that the reserve prices are common knowledge. For the first round of 
bidding, agents use the reserve prices as the asking prices. At the beginning of round 𝑡, a 
customer agent 𝑔 selects a feasible package that maximizes its utility function given the 
asking prices, and generate the bid. 
Bids screening and termination 
After receiving bids from the agents, the service provider agent first screens out any 
invalid bids. Invalid bids are defined as those with (1) any bidding price for a package 
which is below the highest bidding price that same package received in previous rounds, 
(2) higher prices from customers who have already declared their final bidding status in a 
previous round, and (3) packages which do not contain the base configuration or that 
violate other configuration rules. 
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Winner determination  
The winner determination model designed is to select a subset of the bids submitted by 
the customers such that the overall bidding price of the provisional allocation is maximized 
and the capacity constraints of the provider are not violated. Let 𝑁𝑡 be the set of customers 
that submitted their bids at round 𝑡 and 𝑝𝑗
𝑡(𝐵𝑗
𝑡) be the bidding price of customer 𝑗 at round 
𝑡, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑡, where 𝐵𝑗
𝑡 is the package submitted by customer 𝑗 at round 𝑡. Let 𝑍𝑗 = 1 if 
customer 𝑗 wins and 𝑍𝑗 = 0 otherwise. The winner determination model can be expressed 
using the following integer programming. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑ 𝑍𝑗𝑝𝑗
𝑡(𝐵𝑗





≤ 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑖), 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑚     (6) 
𝑍𝑗 = {0,1},    𝑗 ∈ 𝑁
𝑡       (7) 
    
Constraints (6) ensure that the bids awarded in a provisional allocation do not violate 
the provider’s capacity constraints. Constraint (7) is a set of integer constraints. 
Price Update  
In the bidding procedure for the service mass customization problem, the prices are 
updated according to the price update rules in the IbSCHF. 
A worked example is presented next, to demonstrate the application of the IbSCHF to 
travel package customization. 
6.2.3 A worked example 
This subsection presents a worked example to demonstrate the bidding process of 
applying the IbSCHF to the travel package customization problem. Suppose a travel agency 
offers a “build your own package” tool to its customers so they can customize their vacation 
packages for a 7-day holiday at a popular destination. Customers should travel to the 
destination on Day 1 and return on Day 7. The agency offers a list of travel components 
including flight reservations, hotel reservations, car rental, and tickets to entertainment 
 91 
 
events. There are multiple services for each of the components to accommodate various 
customer preferences. For example, a Departure Ticket (DT) can be scheduled in the 
morning (DT-1), afternoon (DT-2), or evening (DT-3). For illustrative purposes, an 
example of an unrealistically small number of customers (five customers) is set up. The 
available services and their respective capacities are summarized in Table 6-1. Table 6-2 
shows the customers’ feasible packages and their valuations of them, where B(a, b) 
represents feasible package b from customer a. The base configuration includes one and 
only one service of each of the components DT, RT, and HL. Customers can have one to 
five services from the component ET. To limit the number of rounds of bidding, high 
reservation prices are set for the packages (see Table 6-2). Submitted bids, provisional 
allocation, provider’s revenue, and customer’s value at each round of bidding are 
summarized in Table 6-3. ε is set to be five. The auction terminates at round 12 with overall 
customer value at 7370. Compared to the optimal value of 7790, the auction reaches 95% 
efficiency in this example. The sum of the prices paid by the customers (i.e., the provider’s 
revenue) is 7240, which is close to the overall solution value due to competition among 
customers. The provisional allocations along the bidding process manifest the heuristic 
search guided by the changing package bidding prices. 
 
Table 6-1 Summary of service capacity 
Service ID Service Description Capacity 
DT-1 Departure Ticket in the morning of Day 1 3 
DT-2 Departure Ticket in the afternoon of Day 1 2 
DT-3 Departure Ticket in the evening of Day 1 2 
RT-1 Return Ticket in the morning of Day 7 2 
RT-2 Return Ticket in the afternoon of Day 7 2 
RT-3 Return Ticket in the evening of Day 7 3 
HL-1 First-class hotel 1 
HL-2 Second-class hotel 3 
HL-3 Motel 2 
ET-1 Sporting event ticket  2 
ET-2 Performing arts ticket 2 
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ET-3 Museum ticket 3 
ET-4 Cruise trip ticket 3 
ET-5 Fine dining ticket 2 
 
 
Table 6-2 Customers’ feasible packages and corresponding reservation prices and value 
Customer Feasible Packages Reservation Price  ($) Value ($) 
Cus#1 
B (1,1) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL3" "ET2" "ET3"} 1410 1445 
B (1,2) = {"DT2" "RT1" "HL1" "ET1""ET3" "ET4" 
"ET5" } 
2200 2250 
B (1,3) = {"DT3" "RT2" "HL2" "ET4"} 1830 1870 
Cus#2 
B (2,1) = {"DT1" "RT3" "HL1" "ET1" "ET2"} 2120 2145 
B (2,2) = {"DT1" "RT1" "HL1"  "ET1" "ET4" "ET5"} 2320 2360 
B (2,3) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL2" "ET1" "ET3""ET4"} 2060 2085 
Cus#3 
B (3,1) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL1" "ET1" "ET2" "ET3"  
"ET5"} 
2210 2235 
B (3,2) = {"DT1" "RT2" "HL1" "ET1" "ET3""ET4"} 2360 2370 
Cus#4 
B (4,1) = {"DT2" "RT1" "HL3" "ET1""ET2"  "ET3"  
"ET4"} 
1660 1695 
B (4,2) = {"DT2" "RT1" "HL2" "ET1" "ET3"} 1730 1740 
Cus#5 
B (5,1) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL2" "ET5"} 1610 1660 
B (5,2) = {"DT1" "RT3" "HL1"  "ET1" "ET3" "ET4" 
"ET5"} 
2360 2375 
B (5,3) = {"DT2" "RT2" "HL1" "ET2""ET4" "ET5"} 2130 2135 
B (5,4) = {"DT3" "RT3" "HL3" "ET3" "ET5"} 1290 1295 
B (5,5) = {"DT1" "RT3" "HL2"  "ET3""ET4"} 1910 1945 
  
Table 6-3 Submitted bids, provisional allocation, provider’s revenue, and customer’s value at 
each round of bidding 





1 B (1,2) , B (2,2) , B (3,1) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (2,2), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 5590 5715 
2 B (1,2) , B (2,2) , B (3,1) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (2,2), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 5590 5715 
3 B (1,2) , B (2,2) , B (3,1) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (2,2), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 5590 5715 
4 B (1,3) , B (2,2) , B (3,1) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3), B (2,2), B (5,1) 5760 5890 
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5 B (1,3) , B (2,2) , B (3,2) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3), B (3,2), B (5,1) 5800 5900 
6 B (1,3) , B (2,2) , B (3,2) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3), B (3,2), B (5,1) 5800 5900 
7 B (1,3) , B (2,2) , B (3,2) , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3), B (3,2), B (5,1) 5800 5900 
8 B (1,3) , B (2,1) , B (3,2), B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 
9 B (1,3) , B (2,1) , B (3,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 
10 B (1,3) , B (2,1) ,B (3,2)  , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 
11 B (1,3) , B (2,1) , B (3,1)  , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 
12 B (1,3) , B (2,1) , B (3,1)  , B (4,1) , B (5,1) B (1,3) , B (2,1), B (4,1) , B (5,1) 7240 7370 
 
6.2.4  Incentive Issues 
Given the assumed customers’ private value model, no customer bids above their 
valuation. In all cases, customers will not get negative payoffs, which encourages them to 
participate in the auction.  However, understanding the incentives that a company has for 
setting up and conducting the proposed auction requires some explanation of the 
company’s objectives for auction design. In auction design there are two common 
objectives an auctioneer may have. The first is economic efficiency, and the second is 
revenue maximization (de Vries and Vohra, 2003). An auction is economically efficient if 
the allocation of objects to bidders chosen by the auctioneer maximizes the overall values 
of the bidders. Economic efficiency is supported by well-developed auction theories. A 
typical example is the canonical Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey 
1961; Clark 1971; Groves 1973) which simultaneously achieves incentive compatibility 
and efficiency and has guided the design of many auctions. As a result, the majority of the 
auction literature takes economic efficiency as their design objective.  
It is argued in Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005) that the goal of economic efficiency is 
well suited for the design of stable long-term markets that will form the basis for repeated 
trading. They expect that efficient markets will come to dominate the electronic market 
landscape based on their experience with procurement auctions deployed with a large 
chocolate manufacturer (Hohner et al., 2003). In the context of mass customization, 
economic efficiency is also desirable for a company seeking to build long-term business 
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relationships with their customers. It is agreed in mass customization literature that one of 
the major objectives of mass customization is to improve customer value. In the long run, 
a company can only improve its profit by providing customers with high value-added 
products and services. The long term benefits brought by efficient auction design provide 
an incentive for companies to adopt economic efficiency as their auction design objective.  
The objective of revenue maximization (optimal auction design), on the other hand, 
maximizes the auctioneer’s revenue. Optimal auctions maximize the seller’s revenue at 
every transaction, which are perhaps more appropriate for a one-shot procurement problem, 
and in a settings where the buyer has considerable market power (Parkes and Kalagnanam, 
2005). However, even if a company only cares about short term benefits and wants to get 
the most out of every transaction, an efficient auction design may still be the more 
reasonable choice, especially when iterative bidding is used as an implementation structure. 
This is because there are no known optimal (i.e. revenue-maximizing) general-purpose 
combinatorial auctions, iterative or otherwise (Parkes, 2006). In fact, the dynamic 
exchange of value information between bidders that is enabled within iterative 
combinatorial auctions is known to enhance revenue and efficiency in single-item auctions 
with correlated values (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). One should expect efficient iterative 
combinatorial auctions to retain this benefit over their sealed-bid counterparts (Parkes, 
2006). Therefore, from both long-term and short-term perspectives, a company has clear 
incentives to deploy an efficient combinatorial auction.  
The IbSCHF is an efficient auction design which is implemented using an iterative 
bidding process. The bidding process is guided by a price mechanism. The revenue that the 
auctioneer collects is the sum of the bidding prices from the awarded customers at winner 
determination. Given the design of the bidding procedure, the company’s revenue is 
guaranteed to increase along the bidding process and reach its highest at termination.  
Despite the formulation of the economic efficiency objective of the SCCC, the iterative 
bidding structure itself achieves high seller revenue in the same spirit of many real-world 
iterative auction applications, which supports our claim that the proposed model provides 
incentives to the seller. The performance gained by applying the IbSCHF on general SCCC 
problems is evaluated through a computational study in the next section. 
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6.2.5 Value and revenue performance under various product customizability  
Products with a higher level of customizability will likely meet individual customer 
needs better. However, a higher level of customizability often leads to higher costs. To 
manage the customization costs and improve operational efficiency, service providers 
usually restrict customers’ choices in choosing service combinations by imposing 
configuration rules. The proposed customization model allows providers to adjust the 
customizability of packages by defining different base configurations. When customizing 
a package, a customer is required to incorporate the services defined in the base 
configuration into the package. In terms of platform-based product development, the base 
configuration serves as a base product on which customers build their customized products. 
In this section, the value and revenue performance of applying the IbSCHF to SCCC 
problems is validated under various levels of product customizability imposed by the 
service provider. The proposed framework is also compared with the commonly used first-
come-first-served capacity allocation approach in terms of solution values. The design of 
the set of testing data used for the experiments is described as follows. 
6.2.6 Design of the testing data 
The customization environment in which the computational study is conducted is the 
one described in the worked example. However, to demonstrate the practical relevance of 
the experiments, the number of customers and the capacity of services are now increased 
to a realistic scale. Customer value is generated from common pricing schemes found in 
online travel auctions. In travel auction websites, such as eBay Travel 
(http://www.ebay.com), Luxury Link (http://www.luxurylink.com), and Sky Auction 
(http://www.skyauction.com), a package to be sold has a “buy it now” price which is 
usually its regular retail price. A customer can purchase the package immediately at the 
regular retail price if unwilling to wait until the termination of the auctions. However, if 
the customer wants a bargain, they must participate in the auction. 
The final auction price is determined by the market competition at the termination of 
the auction. A package also has a reservation price. The reservation price is often unknown 
to the customers. In the design of the testing data, it is assumed that there is a regular retail 
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price for each of the available services, and the retail price for a package is the sum of the 
retail prices of the services included in the package. The reservation price for a package is 
set to be 40% of its retail price, since it is common in the online travel auctions that the 
termination price can be as low as 60% below the regular retail price. It is assumed that 
customers who enter the auction expect some discount. They are not interested in 
purchasing the package at a price higher than the regular retail price. Customer values for 
a package are randomly drawn from a uniform probability distribution between reservation 
price and its regular retail price. Ten SCCC problem groups are generated, with the 
customer number ranging from 100 to 1,000. For each group, ten instances are randomly 
generated. Service capacity is also allocated in proportion to the number of customers such 
that, for most of the instances, around 80–90% of the customers will be awarded a feasible 
package. For all instances, a customer’s feasible package must contain one DT, one RT, 
and one HL. 
6.2.7 Simulation results 
In this section the value and revenue performance of applying the IbSCHF to an SCCC 
problem is validated under various levels of product customizability imposed by the service 
provider. For the computational study, three levels of product customizability are 
considered. The three levels are defined by different base configurations: Config#1 = {one 
of DT, one of RT, one of HL}, Config#2 = {one of DT, one of RT, one of HL, one of ET}, 
Config#3 = {one of DT, one of RT, one of HL, three of ET}. The numbers of services 
contained in the three configurations are 3, 4, and 6, respectively. The solutions computed 
under Config#1 are used as the baseline for comparison. For each group of problem 
instances, the optimal solution value under Config#1 is computed by solving the SCCC 
integer programming model presented in section 6.2.1 “Centralized problem formulation”. 
The SCCC model is coded in ILOG Optimization Programming Language (http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/websphere/products/optimization/) and the ten groups of problem 
instances are solved using ILOG CPLEX. 
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The flow control of the iterative bidding is coded in the OPL (Optimization 
Programming Languages) script language. A desktop PC with a 2.4G Intel CPU and 8 GB 
of memory is used to run the experiments. 
Table 6-4 Customer value and provider revenue generated at different levels of package 
customizability 


























1 $211,705 $210,535 $174,380 $166,420 $110,080 $96,585 $73,085 $57,890 
2 $421,970 $418,100 $333,470 $326,270 $221,990 $197,225 $129,240 $102,740 
3 $633,215 $618,880 $482,370 $493,610 $336,620 $294,485 $173,650 $137,970 
4 $848,365 $846,295 $691,550 $662,700 $448,860 $397,790 $211,955 $166,980 
5 $1,055,680 $1,039,410 $814,790 $816,505 $563,895 $503,075 $279,435 $219,160 
6 $1,269,615 $1,245,415 $963,130 $954,235 $676,915 $599,330 $333,085 $259,360 
7 $1,473,780 $1,453,190 $1,130,300 $1,128,480 $787,980 $696,880 $390,545 $303,210 
8 $1,688,120 $1,680,505 $1,354,670 $1,294,280 $900,455 $802,365 $453,520 $353,030 
9 $1,907,200 $1,889,915 $1,476,390 $1,497,350 $1,014,995 $899,630 $515,165 $402,940 
10 $2,114,810 $2,101,835 $1,681,890 $1,655,410 $1,126,325 $994,805 $568,815 $443,030 
 
The solutions computed by applying the IbSCHF are compared to the optimal ones 
computed by ILOG CPLEX. The first column of Table 6-4 shows the average optimal 
solution values for the ten groups of testing problems. The second and the third columns 
show the solution value and revenues computed by applying the IbSCHF, respectively. All 
customers are assumed to adopt final-bid-repeating and ε = 20 for all bidding. It is observed 
that the solution computed by applying the IbSCHF can achieve, on average, 98% of the 
optimal value across the ten groups of problem instances. The average revenue computed 
is approximately 78% of the optimal value. 
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To evaluate the impacts of package customizability on customer value, the testing 
problems are solved again with Config#2 and Config#3. When conducting the iterative 
bidding, all bidding packages which do not satisfy Config#2’s and Config#3’s 
configuration requirements are excluded at the bid screening stage. Columns five and six 
of Table 4 show the solution values and the revenues, respectively, with Config#2. It is 
observed that, on average, the solution value decreases to 53% of that of Config#1, and 
revenues decrease to 59% of those achieved with Config#1. If Config#3 is applied, the 
solution value will decrease to 27% of Config#1’s value, and revenues will decrease to 
28% of those achieved with Config#1. It is evident from the simulation results that reducing 
product customizability can significantly decrease both customers’ overall value and 
provider’s revenue. 
The proposed customization approach is also compared to the commonly used first-
come-first-served capacity allocation policy. For example, “build your own package” 
applications in the travel industry usually allocate a provider’s capacity on a first-come-
first-served basis combined with dynamic pricing strategies. Again, take travel package 
customization as an example. To compare the performance of an auction-based policy 
against that of a first-come-first-served capacity allocation policy, each policy is applied to 
the ten groups of SCCC testing problems. Column 4 of Table 6-4 shows the solution value 
of the first-come-first-served policy compared to the testing problems under Config#1. It 
is clear that the first-come-first-served policy achieves on average 78% of the value 
obtained by the auction-based approach.  
6.3 Appointment scheduling in the health care system 
Today’s healthcare systems face increasing demands in both the number of patients 
and the services that patients require, which often stretches limited resources beyond 
capacity. More and more patients must be treated with the same limited resources and 
budget. Nevertheless, the quality of service cannot be compromised. In addition to the 
perceived quality of medical services that they receive, patients’ satisfaction with their 
healthcare providers is also affected by their appointment booking experiences. Patients 
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want more personalized care, which includes involvement in selecting appointment times 
with their preferred doctors.  
Most of the government policies and researchers focus on improving the speed of 
access to the health care system and decreasing waiting time, but for non-urgent care, 
patients place a value on seeing the doctor of their choice, and on doing so  at a convenient 
time. Using the discrete choice experiment method among 1153 patients, G. Rubin et al 
(2006) found that the waiting time to make an appointment was only important if the 
appointment was for a child or when it was for a new health problem. In that survey, 
participants were asked to make their choices in a questionnaire that offered three 
categories: speed of access (time to appointment), choice of doctor and choice of time (they 
could choose their preferred time for an appointment). For responders who were employed, 
choice of time was six times more important than shorter waiting time. Older patients, 
women and those with long-standing physical illnesses preferred to see their own doctor 
for their appointment and they were willing to wait longer to do so. Gerard, K et al (2008) 
used discrete choice experiments to determine the important factors that influence patient 
choice in the booking an appointment. From their overall responses, the factors influencing 
patient choice in booking appointments were, in order of importance: seeing a doctor of 
their choice; booking at a convenient time of day; seeing any available doctor; and having 
an appointment sooner rather than later. These findings clearly demonstrate that the current 
focus of policy makers on speed of access is oversimplified. In addition, evidence shows 
that when patients were matched and scheduled according to their preferred provider, 
quality of care is  improved (O’Hare and Corlett 2004); also, matching patients with their 
preferred provider and offering them a convenient appointment time can decrease the 
number of no-shows and thereby increase operational efficiency (Barron 1980).  
In 2005, survey results indicated that patients complain about their difficulty in obtaining 
an appointment at a convenient time. (Healthcare Commission 2005).In another survey, 
one in four (25%) said they had been put off from going to their GP practice because the 
opening hours were inconvenient (National Survey of Local Health Services 2006).  
However, accommodating scheduling preferences across a large number of patients is 
particularly challenging due to three areas of complexities, namely collection complexity, 
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allocation complexity and elicitation complexity. Collection complexity refers to the 
efforts needed to collect preferences information from patients. However, collecting 
complete preference information from a large number of patients is not an easy task 
because a patient’s preference is usually not binary. Instead, it is a continuous variable that 
spans the spectrum from highly like to highly dislike. Moreover, a patient’s preferences 
may change over time for the same patient. Some examples of factors that change 
preferences are changes in work schedule or in marital status; this fluidity is one of the 
reasons why the vast majority of appointment booking systems are not automated. They 
have to rely on human schedulers to negotiate with patients to collect preferences 
information, a practice which incurs high administrative costs to the healthcare system. 
Allocation complexity refers to the computation needed to compute high-quality service 
time allocations. Accommodating dynamic preferences can easily make mathematical 
models of the appointment booking process intractable (Gupta and Denton 2008). These 
issues are further complicated by the fact that patients are reluctant to reveal all their 
availability. 
The proposed Iterative bidding framework for non-commercial services presented in 
chapter 5 can be properly applied to appointment scheduling problem. The next section 
demonstrates the multi-agent systems architectural for healthcare scheduling problem that 
can be used to apply the proposed framework. 
6.3.1 The environment 
Multi-agent systems architecture for appointment scheduling can be modelled as shown 
in Figure. 6-1. In this architecture, there are three types of agents that work collaboratively 
to achieve the overall scheduling functions of the system. The Patient agent represents the 
personal assistant of a patient. This agent has a user interface through which patients 
directly input their preferences and availability. A patient can program her preferences and 
availability into the agent and the agent can act on behalf of the patient to automatically 
interact with the hospital scheduler. This agent should also be equipped with optimization 
algorithms to compute the best strategy that it should take given the current scheduling 
situation and the patient’s preferences and availability constraints. The Diagnostic Services 
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(DS) agent represents the hospital scheduler or the secretary of the hospital. Registration 
and lookup services for other agents are provided by the Director Facilitator (DF) agent. In 
this architecture, patient schedules are computed through the negotiation of agents. Patient 
agents and DS agent need to make their local decisions based on their objectives during 
the negotiation process. The patient agents’ and DS agent’s decision problem is formulated 













Figure 6-1 A multi-agent systems architecture for the appointment scheduling problem 
       
6.3.2 Formulation of diagnostic service and patient agent decision problem 
Patient scheduling is a multilateral decision making problem with the diagnostic service 
and patient agents as independent decision makers. The diagnostic service agent needs to 
decide how to schedule service requests to achieve its objectives and, at the same time, 
respect the patients’ availability and their preferred doctor constraints. The decision facing 
a patient agent is how much preference information needs to be revealed in order to 






A. Diagnostic service agent’s local decision making problem 
The diagnostic service agent receives a set of requests from patients’ agents. Each 
request consists of a patient’s preferences regarding her preferred time slot and preferred 
doctors. The model assumes the durations of all diagnose services are deterministic. A 
patient is assigned a weight scale by the diagnostic service agent, denoted as   wj. Given 
the requests from patients and the available service time slots, the provider needs to solve 
an optimization problem: determining the allocation of limited service time slots to the 
requests so that the sum of the weights of the awarded requests is maximized. The 
diagnostic service agent will not assign patient p a time slot and a doctor outside her 
preferences. 
Formally, let T be the set of time slots available at the time of scheduling; P be the set 
of patients who have diagnostic requests to be processed; D be the set of doctors; and wp 
be the priority level assigned to patient p. Let Adt = 1 if doctor d is available at time slot t; 
let Rpdt = 1 if patient p requests doctor d in time slot t; let Xpdt  = 1 if doctor d at time 
slot t is assigned to patient p. The patient scheduling problem for diagnostic services can 
then be formulated as follows. 
 




∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑝𝑑𝑡  ≤ 1 ,                                ∀
𝑡∈𝑇𝑑∈𝐷
𝑝 ∈ 𝑃                             (1) 
∑ 𝑋𝑝𝑑𝑡  ≤ 1 ,                                   ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇
𝑝∈𝑃
                  (2) 
∑ 𝑋𝑝𝑑𝑡  ≤ 𝐴𝑑𝑡 ,                                 ∀𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, ∀ 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇                 (3)
𝑝∈𝑃
 
∑ ∑ 𝑋𝑝𝑑𝑡  = ∑ ∑   𝑅𝑝𝑑𝑡    𝑋𝑝𝑑𝑡
𝑡∈𝑇𝑑∈𝐷
 ,       ∀
𝑡∈𝑇𝑑∈𝐷




The set of constraints (1) ensures that any patient can only obtain one time slot. The set 
of constraints (2) ensures that a doctor’s time slot can only be assigned to one patient. The 
set of constraints (3) ensures that if a doctor’s time slot is assigned to a patient, that assigned 
time slot should belong to the doctor’s working time slots. The set of constraints (4) ensures 
that a doctor’s time slot should assigned be within a patient’s requests. 
B. Patient agents’ Decision Problem 
Each patient indicates its preferred time slot(s) and preferred doctor(s) in his agent 











Preferred time Preferred doctor
Submit
 
Figure 6-2 The patient agent interface 
 
Each patients’ preferences are their private information and are not known to the 
diagnostic service agent. We assume that a patient agent prefers some combination of time 
slot and doctor over others. The preferences can be quantified by associating a preference 
violation cost to each combination of time slot and doctor. We assume that a patient agent 
orders Preferred Combinations (PCs) according to the increasing order of their preference 
violation costs. That is, given an ordered PC,  c1 < c2 < c3 < ⋯ ck … < c|PC| < c0 is 
known to the patient agent, where ck denotes the preference violation cost of the kth 
combination in set of PCs, and c0 denotes the preference violation cost of not being 
allocated any time slot. Patient agents try to avoid high cost assignments by not revealing 
their complete preferences. Since no payment is allowed in the patient scheduling setting, 
the possibility of applying the standard one-shot VCG mechanism (Clarke 1971, Groves 
1973, and Vickrey 1961) or even its iterative implementations (Parkes 2006) is eliminated. 
The proposed iterative bidding framework for non-commercial services systematically 
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evolves the solution towards an optimal one given the constraint that patient agents try to 
avoid high cost assignments by not revealing their complete preferred combinations.  
6.3.3 Appointment scheduling using the proposed framework 
If patients are modelled as agents and the hospital as the auctioneer, the appointment 
scheduling problem is mapped to a distributed non-commercial service scheduling 
problem. The agent modeling and bidding process configuration for an appointment 
scheduling problem are similar to those detailed in Chapter 5. We briefly describe the 
bidding process in the context of the appointment scheduling problem as follows. 
 The DS agent (auctioneer) first collects the availability information of the hospital’s 
resources and the doctors within the time window to be scheduled. Then, it sends 
messages to all its patient agents who have been registered by DF agent, indicating 
that the hospital is now ready to receive requests. The bidding process follows an 
iterative pattern. 
 At the beginning of each round, a patient agent needs to decide whether it will 
submit additional preferences or not. 
 Based on the bids and the available time slots, and on the availability of the doctors, 
DS agent computes a provisional schedule which includes the winning bids.  
 The losing customers can bid in the subsequent rounds by adjusting their bids, i.e. 
they can select a combination of time slot and doctor with the lowest cost from the 
unrevealed part of their PCs and submit it to the DS agent. 
 If a provisional schedule includes all the patients, or if there is no update of the bids 
from the losing patient agents, the bidding terminates and the current provisional 
schedule is implemented. 
6.3.4  Summary 
This chapter describes the application of the IbSCHF to two problem domains: service 
customization under capacity constraints and appointment scheduling in a health care 
system. Since service customization is a type of distributed service scheduling problem, 
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the proposed iterative bidding framework becomes a natural solution. For the appointment 
scheduling problem, applying the IbSCHE is a novel way to unify the exploration of 








Chapter 7 Design Specification and 
Implementation  
This chapter presents the design and implementation of a prototype environment for 
the IbSCHF proposed in chapter 4. The main objective of developing such a prototype is 
twofold: 1) to test the feasibility of implementing the proposed distributed service 
scheduling system in a more realistic multi-agent environment; and 2) to evaluate the 
proposed system in terms of its communication costs and system responsiveness. In 
particular, the main tasks for the development of such a prototype include:  
 Understanding the functional and non-functional requirements to develop the 
prototype in a distributed environment ; 
 Designing  a  .NET-based  iterative  bidding  system which  integrates with the 
winner determination model implemented using ILOG OPL environment; 
 Providing  bidding  interfaces  for  customers and an interface for the service 
provider for service definition; 
 Developing a web service which enables customer agents to interact with the 
scheduling system; 
 Evaluating the scalability of IbSCHF through the use of the developed prototype  
7.1 Functional requirements 
This section defines and describes the functional requirements that must be met in order 
to apply IbSCHF in a real distributed environment. Functionalities are defined from three 
different perspectives: the customer agents’, the service provider agent’s and the 
scheduling system’s. 
7.1.1 Customer Agents 
a) Customer interactions require the following functionalities: 
- Login: Allows customer agents to login to the scheduling system; 
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- Edit feasible bundles: Provides customers with the ability to edit bundles 
submitted to their agents if the bundle of time slots has not been executed in the 
schedule by the time a change has been requested; 
- Set status as standby: Makes it possible for customers to  set their status as 
standby for their preferred time slots; and  
- Cancel schedule: Gives customers the ability to cancel their schedules. 
 
b) Scheduling system interactions 
 The customer agent provides five fundamental functionalities on behalf of a customer: 
submit a bid, receive the winner determination result in each round, update a bid based on 
the received result, and provide the final result to the customer. In general, customers can 
achieve their business objectives and reflect their dynamic changes through the use of their 
agents. The following is the list of the required functionalities: 
- Retrieve available service time slots: Allows customer agents, to retrieve the 
available service time slots and their properties’ information from a web service 
in the scheduling system. 
- Submit bid: Provides customer agents with the ability to submit bids to the 
scheduling system on behalf of customers. 
- Update bid: Allows customer agents to update the parameters of a previously 
submitted bid based on the received result. 
- Receive result of winner determination: Makes it possible for customer 
agents to receive the results of the winner determination problem in each 
iteration. 
- Get final result of schedule: Allows customers to get the final schedule results 
from their customer agents when the auction terminates. 
7.1.2 Service Provider Agent 
The following is the list of functional requirements for a service provider agent. 
- Edit available services: The service provider can add or remove a service. 
He/she can also add or remove a time slot for each service, as well as change 
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the properties of individual service time slots, such as reservation price or 
capacity.  
- Start auction: Utilized to initiate the auction; the service provider agent 
submits all the information about available services, available time slots for 
each service, and their properties to the scheduling system. 
7.1.3 Scheduling System 
The following is the list of the functional requirements for a scheduling system. 
- Receive and store available service information: The scheduling system 
needs to receive and store the updated information about the available service 
time slots and their properties, acquired from the service provider agent. 
- Receive bids: The scheduling system must be able to receive bids from 
customer agents after they submit them. After bids have been received, the 
scheduling system screens out invalid bids. 
- Compute provisional allocation: The scheduling system needs to compute a 
new provisional allocation in each round until the auction is terminated. 
- Update OPL-WDM input: Upon receiving the customer agents’ bids, the 
scheduling system needs to transform the received data into an OPL- Winner 
Determination Model (WDM) input. OPL-WDM input will be used by ILOG 
to solve the winner determination problem. 
- Invoke CPLEX engine: Upon creating the OPL data source, the scheduling 
system invokes and then sends the data source to the CPLEX engine. CPLEX 
engine determines the winning bids during iterations. 
- Terminate auction: This functionality provides the scheduling system with the 
ability to check the termination condition, and, when the condition is satisfied, 
to terminate the auction.  
- Send provisional and final allocation results: The scheduling system needs 
to send the result of the provisional allocation in each round and the final 
allocation results at the end of auction to the customer agents. 
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7.2 User Case Diagrams 
Figures 7-1, 7-2, and 7-3 present the designed use case diagrams that address the 
presented required functionalities. Due to similarities between the requirements and the use 
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Figure 7-3 Use Case diagram for a scheduling system 
 




 Customers follow these steps to edit their set of feasible bundles. 
Actors: Customer 
Preconditions: 
1. The customer has logged in to the customer agent. 
2. The feasible bundle(s) to be edited has not yet been used as a bid by the 
time of submitting the bundle. 
Main flow of events: 
1. Customer agent shows all previously submitted bundles. 
2. Customer adds, removes or edits any of the feasible bundle. 
 
Use case: Get the final schedule results 
Brief Description 
Customers need this process to get the results of the final schedule. 
Actors: Customer 
Preconditions: 
1. The customer has logged in to the customer agent. 
2. The auction has terminated and the final schedule has been computed. 
Main flow of events: 
1. The scheduling system notifies the customer agent about the final 
schedule result. 
2. The customer agent notifies the customer with the result of schedule. 
 
Use case: Update bids 
Brief Description 




Actors: Customer agent 
Preconditions: 
1. The customer agent has received the result of the previous round’s 
provisional allocation. 
Main flow of events: 
1. The customer agent receives the result of the provisional allocation of 
the previous round. If the latest bid has been accepted, the customer 
agent will keep the bidding price unchanged; otherwise, it has three 
price updating options: increase the bidding price, keep the bidding 
price unchanged, and withdraw from bidding process. 
2. The customer agent selects the bundle with the highest payoff  
3. The customer agent submit its bid. 
 
Use case: Compute provisional allocation 
Brief Description 
The scheduling system utilizes this use case to compute a new provisional 
allocation based on the updated bids received from the agents. 
Actors: The scheduling system 
Preconditions: 
1. The scheduling system has received updated bids from the customer 
agents. 
Main flow of events: 
1. After receiving the bids from the customer agents, the scheduling 
system screens out any invalid bids. 
2. The scheduling system verifies the termination condition.   
3. If the termination condition has not been satisfied, the system generates 
the OPL_WDM input. 
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4. CPLEX engine will be invoked by sending it the OPL_WDM input. 
5. CPLEX engine solves the winner determination problem. 
6. The winner determination result is transformed into a format that  can 
be sent to the customer agents.  
4. The scheduling system notifies the customer agents of the scheduling 
result. 
7.3 Non-Functional requirements 
Reliability: The system is a prototype built for research purposes; its reliability is not a 
major concern. However, the system should be able to function correctly with pre-tested 
problem sets and scenarios. 
Scalability: The system should be scalable in terms of increasing the number of customers. 
It should be capable of dealing with service scheduling problems at realistic scales. 
7.4 System Architecture 
This section provides the overall system architecture and software architecture of the 
service scheduling system. 
7.4.1 The overall system architecture 
We use a distributed environment as the context for the design of this service 
scheduling system. As shown in Figure 7-4, in this architecture, the Customer agent 
functions as the personal assistant of a customer, keeping the customer updated about their 
preferred service time slot bundles and informing its customer(s) about the results of their 
requests. Scheduling system in this architecture has eight states. These states can be 
modeled as a state chart, as shown in Figure 7-5. After Initialization, the scheduling system 
will be in the state of receiving bids.  Each new time period  can  trigger  the  transition  
from the  receiving bids  state  to the  bid screening state, where  invalid bids are screened 





Figure 7-4 The service scheduling system’s overall system architecture 
   
If the termination condition is not satisfied, the scheduling system updates the OPL-
winner determination model input in the update OPL-WDM input state. At the computing 
state, the system computes the new winner, incorporating the updated list of bids. During 
this computing state, the system blocks its bidder interface so they cannot submit new bids. 
Once a new winner determination has been computed, the system state changes to the 
announcing results state, in which the system announces the result of the new provisional 
allocation to the customer agents. 
 
Customer CustomerCustomer




















Figure 7-5 State diagram of the scheduling system 
 
7.4.2 Software architecture 
In this section we elaborate the software architecture of the service scheduling system.  
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Figure 7-6 Software architecture of the service scheduling system 
 
Figure 7-6 shows how the software components of the system interact with each other. 
As can be seen from the diagram, the Scheduling System consists of four major 
components: Authenticator web service, Service Management web service, Auction 
Control web service, and CPLEX Engine. Authenticator web service is responsible for 
registering new customers and authenticating registered customers when they login to the 
scheduling system. The Auction Control component provides two interfaces for interaction 
with customer agents and the Service Management component. The Service Management 
web service component is responsible for updating the list of available services. It also 
provide a web service interface for customer agents so that they can invoke the web service 
and view the available services and their properties. The Auction Control component also 
provides a web service interface for customer agents to receive their bids. The CPLEX 
engine component computes the winners of each round; to accomplish this task, CPLEX 
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requires the updated list of bids from the customer agents. The Auction Control component 
provides an interface for a winner determination component to receive the updated list of 
bids in the OPL- WDM input format.  
7.4.3 Graphic user interfaces  
The prototype has two types of user interfaces: customer agent and provider agent. The 
provider agent interface implements the functionalities of the service provider agent. The 
customer agent interface implements the functionalities of customer agents and displays 
the scheduling results. For the demonstration, when the system is initialized, the login 
interface (Figure 7-7) is presented to the customer. If the customer is a new customer, 
registration is required (Figure 7-8). 
 
 
Figure 7-7 Customer login interface 
 
 
Figure 7-8 Customer registration interface 
 
After login has been completed, the customer agent user interface (Figure 7-9) will be 




Figure 7-9 Customer agent interface 
 
Customers can view the list of available service time slots by clicking on the Available 
Services Information button. Service types and available time slots for each service are 
retrieved from the Service Management web service and loaded to the dropdown lists. 
After loading the current available service time slots, customers can select their preferred 
services and their preferred time slots and add them to their Feasible Bundles. The customer 
agent starts its negotiation with the Auction control web service when the customer clicks 
the start bidding button. Once the bids are received, at each specific time period the Auction 
Control component will generate a new WD-OPLM input and invoke the CPLEX engine 
to solve the winner determination model, and the result of the winner determination will 
be announced to the customer agents. Upon receiving the results, the customer agents 
should make their decisions about updating their bids. This procedure repeats until the 
Auction terminates. Customers can be informed about the final schedule by clicking the 





Figure 7-10  Provider agent user interface for adding a new service 
 
Figure 7-11 Provider agent user interface for editing service information 
 
Service providers can submit their available service time slots and their properties to 
the service management web service by using the service provider agent interface (Figure 
7-10). Service providers can also edit or remove a service by using the editing interface 
shown above (Figure 7-11). 





















- schedule (Bid[] bids)












- sendBid(int customerId, Bid b)
- getAvailableServices()















- login(String userName , String password)
AuthenticationManager
- customerLogin(string username, string 
passowrd)
















































Figure 7-12 Class diagram for service scheduling system 
 
 
Figure 7-12 shows the class diagram for the prototype system. The prototype system is 
divided into four packages: customer agent, scheduling system, common and service 
provider. Each package represents a specific part of the system. 




























Figure 7-13 shows the message passing sequence for the service provider agent 
functionalities. 
 
a) The service provider agent logs into the scheduling system (Steps1-4). 
b) The service provider agent adds to and/or edits the available services and their 
properties and adds them to the scheduling system (Steps 5-8). 
c)  The service provider starts the auction (Steps 9-10). 
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Figure 7-14 shows the messages as they flow during the service scheduling system’s 
bidding process. 
a) The customer submits his/her feasible bundles to the customer agent (Steps1- 2). 
b) The customer agent logs into the scheduling system (Steps 3-8). 
c) The customer agent retrieves the available service information (Steps10-13). 
d) The customer agent submits its bid to the SOPA Service Provider Interface (Step 
14).  
e) The Auction control receives the bids and updates its current bid list (Step 15). 
f) Updated bids are sent to ILOG scheduler Interface (Steps 16-17). 
g) CPLEX Solver computes the solution and returns it to the SOPA Service Provider 
Interface (Steps 20-21). 
h) The SOPA Service Provider Interface sends the scheduling result to the customer 
agents (Step 22). 
 
Figure 7-15 shows the messages for dynamic change management in service scheduling 































7.5 Simulation Result 
In this section we have used the developed prototype to evaluate our approach in terms 
of its scalability. The simulation platform is based on a client-server architecture. The 
auctioneer web services are hosted in a web server and the agents use SOAP to access those 
web services. The auctioneer web server runs on a desktop PC with 2.4GHz Intel CPU and 
8 GB memory. All the agents are equally distributed over two laptop systems, each of 
which has an Intel 2GHz CPU and 4 GB of memory. Every agent generates a random set 
of feasible bundles and their values. When an auction starts, each agent will use the 
generated feasible bundles to bid on. The agent web application and the auctioneer web 
services are implemented using a Visual Studio 2013. Module to generate random problem 
sets, coded in Visual Studio 2013. 
7.5.1 Metrics 
Communication Cost and Response Time, are used as the scalability measures in the 
evaluation. 
Communication Cost is the number and the size of messages sent between agents and the 
auctioneer during an auction, expressed as: 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑡 =  ∑ (|𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑔| + |𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑔|)
𝑔 ∈𝑁𝑡
  
  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = ∑ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑡𝑡 ∈𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 # 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠  
where 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑡 is the load of communication in round 𝑡, 𝑁𝑡 is the set of customers submitted 
their bids at round 𝑡, |𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑔| is the size of requested message by agent  , and |𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑔| is the 
size of respond  message from auctioneer to agent 𝑔. 
Response Time , is considered to be a measure of the computational complexity of the 
proposed approach. The Response Time (in seconds) is the sum of the time required for 
the  winner-determinations, price-updates and communication over all if the auction 
rounds; in other words, the total time it takes for all agents to receive the final schedule 
from the moment an auction starts. 
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To evaluate the scalability, ten groups of problem instances are randomly generated with 
different sizes and structures. The configuration of the test problem sets and their 
corresponding response times, communication costs and memory usage are summarized in 
Table 7-1 and Table 7-2. 
Table 7-1 Configuration of testing problems 
Problem Number 
of agents 
# of service 
time slots 
# of feasible 




1 Group 1 200 30 Random(5,10) 10 
2 Group 2 400 50 Random(5,10) 10 
3 Group 3 600 70 Random(6,11) 10 
4 Group 4 800 90 Random(6,11) 10 
5 Group 5 1000 100 Random(6,15) 10 
6 Group 6 1200 100 Random(6,15) 10 
7 Group 7 1400 110 Random(6,15) 10 
8 Group 8 1600 120 Random(7,20) 10 
9 Group 9 1800 125 Random(7,20) 10 
10 Group 10 2000 130 Random(8,25) 10 
  





Memory Usage (MB) 
Group 1 284.1725 64.99 482.31 
Group 2 363.4935 277.36 701.91 
Group 3 494.61 290.33 937.97 
Group 4 530.189 336.47 1074.42 
Group 5 728.514 376.97 1780.03 
Group 6 782.2695 389.86 1866.46 
Group 7 906.3825 495.19 1929.51 
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Group 8 1141.7535 570.33 2486.09 
Group 9 1220.89 603.002 2732.97 




Figure 7-16 Response time and communication cost when the problem complexity increases 
 
It can be seen from Figure 7-16 that the response time curve is sub-linear on the value axis 
as the problem complexity increases, indicating polynomial run times, and so it is clear that 
the IbSCHF can be applied to large-scale DSSPs. 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter presents the design and implementation of a prototype environment for 
the IbSCHF proposed in chapter 4. The first step was defining the requirements, followed 
by a detailed illustration of the system architecture and of how the software components 
communicate with each other.  The developed prototype was evaluated in terms of its 
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Chapter 8  Conclusion and Future Work 
8.1 Conclusion 
This thesis investigates modeling and computational issues in developing solution 
approaches to the Distributed Service Scheduling Problem (DSSP). Compared to 
traditional manufacturing scheduling, service scheduling poses additional challenges due 
to the significant customer involvement in service processes. The first challenge is that 
service scheduling should be conducted in a distributed environment. The second challenge 
is that service scheduling has to be robust at accommodating contingencies caused by the 
customer involvement in service production. Uncertainty in customer demand, customer 
cancelations and no-shows make the service scheduling a complex dynamic process. The 
third challenge is the customer’s private information. To compute optimal schedules, 
ideally, the scheduler should know the complete customer availability and preference 
information within the scheduling horizon. However, customers often act strategically to 
protect their private information. Therefore, service scheduling systems should be designed 
so that they are able to elicit the customer’s private information required to compute high 
quality schedules. The fourth challenge is that the objectives in a service scheduling 
environment are complicated and may conflict each other. The distributed service 
scheduling environment enables each agent to have their own scheduling objectives. In 
addition to multiple objectives, since agents are self-interested, they are expected to behave 
strategically to achieve their own objectives without considering the global objectives of 
the system. 
Our objective is to design a framework capable of addressing the challenges in the 
DSSP. An iterative bidding scheduling framework (IbSCHF) that can address the 
challenges of DSSPs concurrently is proposed. IbSCHF uses the price mechanism for 
service scheduling, which may not be applicable for non-commercial services. An adapted 
IbSCHF is also proposed for scheduling non-commercial services without using a price 




IbSCHF for DSSPs 
By applying IbSCHF in an agent-based architecture, the challenges of DSSPs can be 
addressed effectively. IbSCHF provides a structure for the agents and the service provider 
to interact in a systematic way and eventually evolve the provisional solutions towards an 
optimal one. In IbSCHF, agents are not required to reveal all their private information; they 
reveal their private information only as it becomes necessary. It also has the potential of 
accommodating dynamic changes. IbSCHF can be applied to efficiently allocate the newly-
available service time slots created by dynamic events. 
The framework has been evaluated experimentally. The results indicate that, compared 
with the one-shot VCG auction system, the IbSCHF requires less information revelation, 
improves on the computational properties, and its computed solutions are very close to 
optimal. As a demonstration of the applicability of the framework, it was applied to the 
Service Customization under Capacity Constraints (SCCC) problem. By applying the 
IbSCHF to the SCCC problem, customer’s customization decision making are integrated 
with the allocation of the service provider’s capacity through multilateral negotiations 
between the service provider and its customers.   
Adapted IbSCHF for non-commercial service scheduling problems 
The IbSCHF uses price mechanism to allocate service time slots to customers. 
However, in non-commercial service scheduling environments, service providers cannot 
use a price mechanism to schedule customers along the service timelines. Therefore, 
IbSCHF has been adapted for non-commercial service scheduling problems. The service 
provider needs customers’ availability information to improve resource utilization. On the 
other hand, customers may be of “two minds” about communicating their private 
information. While communicating certain amount of availability might be necessary in 
order to obtain their preferred schedules, too much communication implies a potential cost. 
To address this challenge, an adapted IbSCHF has been developed, designed to generate 
high-quality schedules while protecting customers’ private information. The efficiency and 
information revelation performance of this adapted framework is evaluated through 
theoretical analysis and computational experiments. It was shown that, under the proposed 
mechanism, myopic bidding is the dominant strategy for customers. The privacy and 
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efficiency performance of this proposed adapted mechanism was also evaluated, through a 
computational study. As a demonstration of the realistic applicability of this framework, it 
was applied to the appointment scheduling problem in health care system. 
Design and implementation of a web-based service scheduling prototype  
A web-based service scheduling prototype is designed and implemented using .Net 
technology and web services. The purpose of developing the prototype is first, to 
demonstrate how to implement the IbSCHF in a real-world environment, and second, to 
evaluate the scalability of the approach in a real environment. Scalability is measured in 
terms of response time, communication cost, and memory usage.  
8.2 Directions for Future Research 
Three directions can be outlined in terms of expanding the current work from the 
perspective of improving its applicability to real-world scale applications. 
First, to continue improving the IbSCHF to accommodate more and more dynamic 
changes. The current framework supports customer’s cancelations and uncertainty in 
customers’ arrival time. Other reasons for dynamic changes could be incorporated, for 
example, service durations may be subject to change, and/or certain resources can become 
unavailable.  
Second, the winner determination model could be extended to different application 
domains. The current winner determination model is a general model that can be applied 
to different service application domains. Each application domain has its own constraints 
that will need to be considered. 
At the current stage, I have considered the situation where customer agents have a 
service request from one service provider. However, in some application domains, agents 
may be prefer to receive different services from multiple service providers. In the situation 
where each service provider uses the IbSCHF, exploring agents’ bidding policies in order 
to coordinate separate scheduling system, would be another step towards practical 
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